Texas Still Decides Dog Bites With a 1974 Hog Case. Minnesota's Statute Makes the First Bite Count.

October 27, 2026 · David J.S. Madgett

The leading Texas case on who pays when an animal hurts you is about a hog. A boar got loose from one Van Zandt County farm, moved in on the one next door, and by the neighbor’s account “had charged him ten to twelve times” and “had held him prisoner in his outhouse several times” before it finally bit his hand. Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. 1974). That’s the case Texas courts still cite for dog bites, more than fifty years later.

Minnesota got rid of the hog question in two steps. In 1951 the Legislature passed the statute that’s now Minn. Stat. § 347.22, but only for a person attacked or injured “in any urban area”. 1951 Minn. Laws ch. 315, § 1. Out in the country, a bitten Minnesotan still had to prove the owner knew, and a dog bite on a farm like the ones in the Texas hog case was outside the 1951 statute. It took the Legislature until 1980 to pass an act “removing the urban location requirement in actions for damages against a dog owner”. 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 347, § 1. Today the statute says the dog’s owner pays “to the full amount of the injury sustained”, whether or not anyone knew the dog was dangerous, in town or out.

This piece is part of my Minnesota-vs-Texas series, which started on the paycheck at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-wage-garnishment-571-922/. That series is about debtors. This round is about the person holding a towel to a bite wound, and the honest answer has a twist in it: Texas protects the victim less in court and punishes the owner more in criminal court.

Minnesota counts the first bite

Here’s the statute, all of it that matters:

If a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is acting peaceably in any place where the person may lawfully be, the owner of the dog is liable in damages to the person so attacked or injured to the full amount of the injury sustained. The term “owner” includes any person harboring or keeping a dog but the owner shall be primarily liable.

— Minn. Stat. § 347.22

The Minnesota Supreme Court has been reading that statute since 1953, and it keeps reading it the same way. In 1953 it said the statute imposes “strict liability in damages, irrespective of any question of negligence and without the proof of scienter as at common law,” and that it “leaves the dog owner in the same position which the common law left the keeper of a wild animal; namely, with the strict liability of an insurer.” Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 363, 61 N.W.2d 228 (1953). Scienter is the lawyer word for the owner knowing the dog was dangerous. Minnesota doesn’t ask.

In 1991 the court put it in plainer English: “liability is absolute. It makes no difference that the dog owner may have used reasonable care; negligence is beside the point. Past good behavior of the dog is irrelevant.” Lewellin v. Huber, 465 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. 1991).

Past good behavior is irrelevant. That’s the first bite, counted.

Three more things make the Minnesota statute broader than people assume.

“Injures” doesn’t require an attack. The statute says “attacks or injures”, and the court read the second verb to cover “a dog’s affirmative but nonattacking behavior which injures a person who is immediately implicated by such nonhostile behavior”, like “when a dog exuberantly jumps upon or unintentionally runs into a person and injures that person.” Id. There’s a limit: the dog’s act has to “directly and immediately” produce the injury. Id. at 65. In 2012 the court let a jury decide whether a man who broke his hip pulling a neighbor’s dog off his schnauzer could recover, and it threw out a lower-court rule that the dog’s conduct had to be “focused on” the person hurt. Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626, 628–29, 631 (Minn. 2012).

“Owner” means more than the name on the license. A harborer or keeper counts, though the owner is “primarily liable.” In Anderson the court held a jury could find that a father who let his adult son bring the dog to the family’s Andover house was harboring it, even though the father lived in Sioux Falls and had met the dog once. Id. at 629, 633–34.

Your own carelessness doesn’t cut the check. Minnesota reduces most injury verdicts by the plaintiff’s share of fault, and I walked through how that math works at /news/minnesota-comparative-fault-collateral-source/. Not this one. In Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. 1981), the court held the Legislature meant § 347.22 to impose absolute liability, and in 2011 it summed up the rule: “the absolute liability created by the dog-attack statute cannot be reduced based on the ordinary negligence of the plaintiff-victim.” Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W.2d 400, 405–06 (Minn. 2011).

What the owner does get is provocation, and Minnesota defines it narrowly: “voluntary conduct that exposes the person to a risk of harm from the dog, where the person had knowledge of the risk at the time of the incident.” Id. at 406. In Engquist a nine-year-old reached out in a dark crawl space to hug a Labrador she’d met that day, and a jury told she could provoke a dog by anything that “excites, stimulates, irritates, arouses, induces or enrages” it found provocation. Id. at 402–03. The supreme court affirmed a new trial. Id. at 407. I covered the provocation fight, and the second, broader definition of the word sitting in the same chapter that doesn’t apply to damages claims, at /news/minnesota-dog-bite-statute/.

Texas runs on the rule Minnesota threw out

Here’s the part that surprised me. The rule Texas applies today is, nearly word for word, the rule Minnesota applied everywhere before 1951, and in the countryside until 1980.

In 1939 the Minnesota Supreme Court stated the common law this way: the owner “is liable for harm done by his dog, which he has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its kind to cause harm to others”. Olson v. Pederson, 206 Minn. 415, 416, 288 N.W. 856 (1939). And then it noted what Minnesota’s statute books did and didn’t cover: “The owner is liable without scienter only where his dog kills, wounds, or worries domestic animals.” Id. at 423. “There is no such statute applicable to harm done to human beings.” Id. In 1939, a Minnesota farmer whose sheep got worried by a dog didn’t have to prove the owner knew anything. A person who got bitten did.

Thirty-five years later, Texas adopted the same rule in the hog case. The Supreme Court of Texas held that “suits for damages caused by vicious animals should be governed by principles of strict liability,” and it took the rule straight from the Restatement of Torts § 509:

Except as stated in § 517, a possessor of a domestic animal which he has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm caused thereby to others, except trespassers on his land, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm.

— Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d at 258 (quoting Restatement of Torts § 509 (1938))

Texas courts still list the elements off that page. In November 2024 the Fort Worth court of appeals put the strict-liability claim as three contested points: the dog “had dangerous propensities”, the owners “knew or had reason to know of such propensities”, and “the dangerous propensities caused” the injuries. Herchman v. Lee, No. 02-22-00217-CV, slip op. at 7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 27, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Marshall, 511 S.W.2d at 258–59).

So the “one-bite rule” slogan isn’t quite right, in either direction. Texas doesn’t literally require a prior bite. “Reason to know” is enough, and Marshall held “There is no essential distinction” between that and “should have known.” 511 S.W.2d at 258. Evidence short of a bite can get you there: the Fort Worth court collected Texas cases where a dog that “nipped at people’s ankles” or “snapped at a person” raised a fact question. Herchman, slip op. at 9–10. But a dog with a clean record, on its first bite, usually leaves the bitten Texan without a strict-liability claim. In Minnesota the clean record buys the owner nothing.

What the Texas case that won looked like

Herchman is the Texas rule working the way it’s supposed to, and look at what it took. A Goldendoodle named Jake had bitten a three- or four-year-old’s face at a home daycare. Then he was adopted, and he bit the new family’s adult daughter’s hand and arm, both times badly enough for stitches. Then he bit a young woman’s face on the family’s patio, “over and over again”, and her wounds took 149 stitches. Slip op. at 2–4. The jury awarded $2 million. Id. at 2, 5. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied review on September 5, 2025.

Two prior bites, both with stitches, and the owners knew about both. Id. at 4, 10–11. That’s a strong Texas case. In Minnesota, the third bite and the first bite are the same case.

The defenses are different too

Marshall left a Texas owner one defense Minnesota doesn’t: assumption of the risk. “Voluntary assumption of risk, if established, would be a valid defense.” 511 S.W.2d at 261. (The hog’s neighbor beat it only because the court held he had no free choice: stay “a prisoner inside his own house” or risk the walk to his car. Id. at 260.) In Minnesota, “Neither the common law affirmative defenses nor statutory comparative fault are available to the defendant dog owner.” Lewellin, 465 N.W.2d at 64. Minnesota still lets “you knew the risk” work in a ballpark, and I wrote about where that defense survives at /news/minnesota-assumption-of-risk-foul-ball-ski-hill-soderberg/. Not against a dog.

Marshall also held “contributory negligence is not a defense to this action.” 511 S.W.2d at 259. I wouldn’t lean on that today. Texas’s proportionate-responsibility chapter now applies to “any cause of action based on tort” in which a defendant is found responsible for a percentage of the harm, and it bars a claimant whose “percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 33.002(a)(1), 33.001. The jury apportions responsibility for conduct “by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal standard”. § 33.003(a). As early as 1989, in a case about a bull elephant, the Supreme Court of Texas noted that “Both parties agreed” Marshall had been modified by a 1984 decision and that the owner, “even though strictly liable,” was entitled to a finding on the injured man’s share. Johnson v. Swain, 787 S.W.2d 36, 36–37 (Tex. 1989). That was the parties’ agreement, not a holding. But it’s the way I’d bet.

Then there’s the trespasser carve-out in the Restatement rule: “except trespassers on his land”. Minnesota’s statute gets to a similar place by its own words, since the person has to be somewhere “the person may lawfully be”. A kid who climbs your fence is a different problem, and I covered how Minnesota treats child trespassers at /news/minnesota-child-trespasser-liability-trampoline-pool/.

Is Texas really a one-bite state? Not if the owner just stood there.

This is where Texas is better than its slogan.

Texas has a second theory, negligence, and it doesn’t need a dangerous dog. Marshall said it: “a possessor of a non-vicious animal may be subject to liability for his negligent handling of such an animal.” 511 S.W.2d at 259. The lower courts then built a fence around it. The owner of a non-vicious dog generally isn’t negligent for leaving it unrestrained where it has a right to be, and the Supreme Court of Texas collected five appellate cases holding that. Bushnell v. Mott, 254 S.W.3d 451, 452 & n.1 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).

Bushnell broke through that fence. A woman went to a mobile home to deliver health products. When the customer opened the door, “her three dogs pushed open the door and rushed out” and bit her “on her legs, arms, back, and shoulder.” Id. at 451. She said the owner did nothing to stop it. The court of appeals threw the case out because nobody had shown the owner knew the dogs were dangerous. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed. It framed the question as “whether the owner of a dog not known to be vicious owes a duty to attempt to stop the dog from attacking a person after the attack has begun”, and answered it: “we hold that such a duty exists”. Id. Evidence that she “never once heard [Mott] scold the dogs” was enough to raise a fact question about “whether Mott failed to exercise ordinary care over her dogs once the attack began.” Id. at 453.

So in Texas, an owner who doesn’t know the dog is dangerous can still be liable for how he handles it, including what he does once the biting starts. That’s real. It’s also a negligence case, with duty, breach, causation, and a jury apportioning fault under chapter 33. A Minnesota plaintiff skips all of that.

Texas will send the owner to prison for a first bite. Minnesota usually sends him a bill.

Here’s where Texas wins, and it isn’t close.

Texas makes a serious dog attack a felony. An owner commits an offense if he, “with criminal negligence,” “fails to secure the dog and the dog makes an unprovoked attack on another person that occurs at a location other than the owner’s real property or in or on the owner’s motor vehicle or boat and that causes serious bodily injury” or death. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.005(a)(1). It’s a third-degree felony, or second-degree if the victim dies. § 822.005(b). A third-degree felony carries “not more than 10 years or less than 2 years” in prison and a fine up to $10,000. Tex. Penal Code § 12.34. Notice what isn’t in subsection (a)(1): any requirement that the dog had ever done this before. The first bite counts in Texas too. Just in criminal court, and only off the owner’s property, and only for serious injury.

Minnesota’s closest crime for an injury is a misdemeanor. A person who causes great or substantial bodily harm “by negligently or intentionally permitting any dog to run uncontrolled off the owner’s premises, or negligently failing to keep it properly confined is guilty of a misdemeanor”, and a second violation with the same dog is a gross misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 609.226, subd. 1. A misdemeanor in Minnesota is “not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both”. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 3. Minnesota does have a felony, but it’s for a death, and only where the owner knew the animal had “vicious propensities” or had “caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past”: second-degree manslaughter, up to ten years in prison. Minn. Stat. § 609.205(4). So in Minnesota’s criminal code the first bite counts only if it kills someone, and only if it wasn’t really the first.

On insurance for a dog that’s already been declared dangerous, Minnesota asks for more. A Minnesota owner registering a dangerous dog needs a surety bond or liability policy “in the amount of at least $300,000”. Minn. Stat. § 347.51, subd. 2(2). A Texas owner needs “at least $100,000”. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042(a)(3). Texas’s definition of a dangerous dog also turns on an “unprovoked attack on a person that causes bodily injury” outside a secure enclosure, so a bite inside an enclosure “reasonably certain to prevent the dog from leaving” doesn’t make the dog dangerous under that definition. § 822.041(2)(A). Texas cities and counties may adopt leash and registration rules, § 822.007, and tougher dangerous-dog rules, as long as those “are not specific to one breed or several breeds of dogs”. § 822.047(1).

And none of chapter 822 hands the bitten person a civil claim. I read the whole chapter, through § 822.116, and found no damages provision for a dog bite. The $2 million Herchman case ran on Marshall, and the dissent noted the suit “was not brought pursuant to the Texas Health & Safety Code”. Herchman, No. 02-22-00217-CV, dissenting slip op. at 4 n.4 (Bassel, J.). And neither Marshall nor Bushnell cites a dog-bite statute.

So who protects the person who got bitten?

Minnesota, by a lot.

A Minnesotan bitten by a dog with a spotless record, by the dog’s harborer rather than its owner, or knocked flat by a dog that was only being friendly, has a claim that doesn’t turn on what the owner knew or how careful he was, and that a jury can’t shave for the victim’s ordinary carelessness. A Texan in the same spot has to prove the owner knew or should have known, or build a negligence case, and then watch the jury split the fault.

Texas does one thing better. It treats a serious attack off the owner’s property as a felony, first bite or not. That matters to a prosecutor. It doesn’t pay a medical bill.

Minnesota quit asking what the owner knew in town in 1951 and everywhere in 1980. Texas is still asking about a hog.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC handles Minnesota dog-attack claims under § 347.22, including finding every person who counts as an “owner”, the homeowner’s or renter’s coverage that usually pays these claims, and the provocation defense as the Minnesota Supreme Court actually defines it. More on how we handle injury cases is on our personal injury page. If you or your child was bitten, the facts that matter most are the ones from the minute before, so write them down now and send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (owner liable for the full amount of the injury; “owner” includes harborer or keeper; owner primarily liable); § 347.51, subd. 2(2) (dangerous-dog registration; $300,000 bond or liability policy); § 609.226, subd. 1 (harm caused by dog; misdemeanor; gross misdemeanor on second violation with same dog); § 609.02, subd. 3 (misdemeanor defined); § 609.205(4) (second-degree manslaughter; death caused by animal known to have vicious propensities or to have caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past) (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2026 Minnesota Statutes). 1951 Minn. Laws ch. 315, § 1 (original statute; “in any urban area”; approved April 12, 1951); 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 347, § 1 (urban requirement removed; owner primarily liable; approved March 3, 1980) (Revisor session-law PDFs). Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 363, 61 N.W.2d 228 (1953) (strict liability without scienter; liability of an insurer); Olson v. Pederson, 206 Minn. 415, 416, 423, 288 N.W. 856 (1939) (common-law rule; no statute for harm to human beings); Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. 1981) (absolute liability); Lewellin v. Huber, 465 N.W.2d 62, 64–65 (Minn. 1991) (absolute liability; past good behavior irrelevant; “injures” covers nonattacking conduct; direct and immediate causation; common-law defenses and comparative fault unavailable); Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W.2d 400, 402–03, 405–07 & n.4 (Minn. 2011) (facts and instruction; liability cannot be reduced for plaintiff’s ordinary negligence; provocation defined; new trial affirmed); Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626, 628–29, 631, 633–34 (Minn. 2012) (no “focus” requirement; harboring a jury question). Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.005(a)(1), (b) (attack by dog; felony); § 822.007 (local leash and registration rules); § 822.041(2)(A) (dangerous dog defined); § 822.042(a)(3) ($100,000 liability coverage); § 822.047(1) (local dangerous-dog rules not breed-specific); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.001 (bar above 50 percent), § 33.002(a)(1) (applicability), § 33.003(a) (percentage of responsibility); Tex. Penal Code § 12.34 (third-degree felony punishment) (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council). Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 256, 258–61 (Tex. 1974) (strict liability for animal owner knows or has reason to know is dangerous; Restatement of Torts § 509; “reason to know” and “should have known”; contributory negligence no defense; negligent handling of non-vicious animal; assumption of risk); Bushnell v. Mott, 254 S.W.3d 451, 451–53 & n.1 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (duty of owner of dog not known to be vicious to attempt to stop an attack once begun); Johnson v. Swain, 787 S.W.2d 36, 36–37 (Tex. 1989); Herchman v. Lee, No. 02-22-00217-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 27, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.), slip op. at 2–5, 7, 9–11, and dissenting slip op. at 4 n.4 (Bassel, J.); Texas Second Court of Appeals case information, No. 02-22-00217-CV (petition for review denied Sept. 5, 2025). This article is general information about Minnesota law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied.

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