Sign a Too-Broad Noncompete in Texas and the Judge Has to Rewrite It for Your Boss. Sign One in Minnesota Since July 1, 2023, and It's Void.

October 30, 2026 · David J.S. Madgett

Say your employer hands you a noncompete that bars you from your whole industry, in five states, for three years. Way too broad. Any lawyer would say so.

In Texas, that doesn’t get you out of it. The Texas statute tells the judge that if the covenant is otherwise valid but its limits on time, territory, or activity go further than the employer needs, “the court shall reform the covenant” and “enforce the covenant as reformed”. Shall. The judge doesn’t strike the bad clause. The judge fixes it, for the employer, and then enforces the fixed version against you.

In Minnesota, if you signed it on or after July 1, 2023, there’s nothing to fix. It’s void.

This is a round in my Minnesota-vs-Texas series, which started on the paycheck at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-wage-garnishment-571-922/. Minnesota wins this one for the worker, and it isn’t close. But there’s a Texas twist at the end that a lot of Houston- and Dallas-based employers with Minnesota workers haven’t thought through.

Minnesota didn’t tighten the rule. It threw the rule out.

The statute is Minn. Stat. § 181.988, signed May 24, 2023. Its operative sentence is fifteen words:

(a) Any covenant not to compete contained in a contract or agreement is void and unenforceable.

— Minn. Stat. § 181.988, subd. 2(a)

A “covenant not to compete” is an agreement that restricts the employee, after the job ends, from performing “work for another employer for a specified period of time”, “work in a specified geographical area”, or work for another employer “in a capacity that is similar to the employee’s work for the employer that is party to the agreement.” § 181.988, subd. 1(a). “Employee” includes independent contractors. Subd. 1(c). There are two exceptions, and both are about owners, not workers: a covenant agreed on “during the sale of a business”, and one agreed on “in anticipation of the dissolution of a business.” Subd. 2(b)(1)–(2). An employee who has to go to court over a void covenant may get his lawyer paid: “a court may award an employee who is enforcing rights under this section reasonable attorney fees.” Subd. 2(d).

And it only looks forward. The session law says: “This section is effective July 1, 2023, and applies to contracts and agreements entered into on or after that date.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 53, art. 6, § 1.

I walked through the whole statute, its exceptions, and what still governs a 2019 noncompete at /news/minnesota-non-compete-ban-guide/. I won’t repeat it. What matters here is the one thing the Minnesota statute took away from judges: the power to rescue a bad covenant.

Minnesota judges used to have that power, and they didn’t have to use it

Before July 1, 2023, Minnesota courts measured a noncompete for reasonableness, and a court could trim an overbroad one under what lawyers call the blue-pencil doctrine. A Minnesota court “can take an overly broad restriction and enforce it only to the extent that it is reasonable.” Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). But in the same opinion, the court of appeals said the part that matters: “While it is certainly within the power of the trial court to modify this contract, no cases say that a court must do so.” Id. The employee was a bank vice president who’d worked there four months before he got a better offer and eight months in total before he was fired. The court held the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by refusing to rewrite the covenant. Id. at 88–89.

That rule still governs agreements signed before July 1, 2023. So even on an old Minnesota noncompete, rewriting is a judge’s choice. In Texas, it’s a judge’s job.

Texas wrote the opposite statute in 1989, and it did it on purpose

Texas wasn’t always friendly to noncompetes. In 1987, the Supreme Court of Texas adopted a “common calling” test that, as the same court later described it, “essentially barred noncompete agreements that protected even reasonable business interests of an employer.” Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 772 (Tex. 2011). The Legislature answered in 1989 with the Covenants Not to Compete Act. In the Court’s words, the Act “was intended to reverse the Court’s apparent antipathy to covenants not to compete”. Id.

The Act, as it reads today:

(a) Notwithstanding Section 15.05 and subject to any applicable provision of Subsection (b) and Section 15.501, a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.

— Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50(a) (emphasis added)

Section 15.05 is the Texas antitrust statute, the one that says “Every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful.” § 15.05(a). The noncompete statute starts with the word “Notwithstanding” and carves itself out.

And it shuts the courthouse door on anything else. The Act’s criteria and remedies “are exclusive and preempt other law, including common law.” § 15.52. A Texas judge who thinks a noncompete is a bad idea doesn’t get to say so through some other doctrine.

The Supreme Court of Texas got the message. In Marsh, a managing director who’d been with the company since 1983 signed a two-year restriction in exchange for the right to exercise stock options, then left for a direct competitor in Dallas less than three years later. 354 S.W.3d at 766–67. The trial court and the court of appeals held the covenant unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, and held that stock options could support a noncompete because they were “reasonably related to the company’s interest in protecting its goodwill”. Id. at 766. Then it added a line I’d frame if I practiced in Austin: “We are somewhat befuddled by the continued antipathy to reliance on consensual and reasonable non-competes”. Id. at 779.

That’s the highest court in Texas, puzzled that anybody was still hostile to noncompetes twenty-two years after the Legislature told it not to be.

What happens in Texas when the noncompete goes too far?

The judge rewrites it. Here’s the sentence:

(c) If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, except that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall be limited to injunctive relief.

— Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51(c) (emphasis added)

Think about what that does to an employer’s incentives. Draft it as broad as you like. If nobody challenges it, the employee lives under the broad version, because most people don’t hire a lawyer to test a contract they signed on their first day. If somebody does challenge it, the usual worst case is that a judge cuts it down to the most you could lawfully have asked for, and enforces that. The main penalty for overreaching is that the employer loses damages for any breach before the rewrite, and after the rewrite, all it can get is an injunction. The Marsh Court put it plainly: if any provision is overbroad, “the trial court has the authority to reform the Agreement and enforce it by injunction with reasonable limitations.” 354 S.W.3d at 778.

Texas does give the employee two things back, and they’re real.

The first is the burden of proof. When the agreement’s main purpose is to get you to work, for a term or at will, the employer “has the burden of establishing that the covenant meets the criteria specified by Section 15.50”. § 15.51(b). The employer has to prove the covenant is reasonable. You don’t have to prove it isn’t.

The second is a narrow fee award. If the employer knew when you signed that the covenant’s limits weren’t reasonable, and then tried to enforce it further than it needed to, the court “may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees,” of defending the suit. § 15.51(c). The employee has to prove both things, including what the employer knew. That’s a high bar. Minnesota’s fee sentence asks only whether you were “enforcing rights under this section”. § 181.988, subd. 2(d).

Texas does draw hard lines, for health care

In 2025 the Texas Legislature went the other way for one slice of the workforce. S.B. 1318 passed the Senate 30 to 0, the House 126 to 12, and took effect September 1, 2025. It rewrote the rule for physicians. As amended, a physician’s noncompete has to meet a list of requirements, and among them, the covenant must:

  • provide for a buyout “in an amount that is not greater than the physician’s total annual salary and wages at the time of termination of the contract or employment”;
  • “expire not later than the one-year anniversary of the date the contract or employment has been terminated”; and
  • limit the territory “to no more than a five-mile radius from the location at which the physician primarily practiced”. § 15.50(b)(2), (4).

Before 2025, the buyout was set “at a reasonable price” or by an arbitrator. The bill struck that language. And a new subsection voids a physician’s noncompete outright if the physician is “involuntarily discharged from contract or employment without good cause.” § 15.50(d). A new section extends the buyout cap, the one-year limit, and the five-mile radius to dentists, licensed nurses, and physician assistants. § 15.501(b). The changes apply “only to a covenant not to compete entered into or renewed on or after the effective date of this Act.” S.B. 1318, 89th Leg., R.S., § 4 (Tex. 2025).

One year and five miles, for doctors and nurses, in Texas. In Minnesota, the same nurse’s employment noncompete, signed on or after July 1, 2023, is good for zero years and zero miles. It’s void.

The Texas noncompete in Marsh was really a nonsolicit

Here’s the detail in Marsh that a Minnesota reader should catch. The document Cook signed was titled a “Non-Solicitation Agreement”. It barred him, for two years, from soliciting or accepting the type of business Marsh offered from the clients and prospects he’d worked with, and from poaching the employees who reported to him. 354 S.W.3d at 767. The Supreme Court of Texas treated it as a covenant not to compete and ran it through the Act.

Minnesota’s statute draws that line the other way. “A covenant not to compete does not include a nonsolicitation agreement, or agreement restricting the ability to use client or contact lists, or solicit customers of the employer.” § 181.988, subd. 1(a). The same sentence carves out nondisclosure and trade-secret agreements.

So the honest part of the scorecard: a Minnesota employer can still bind you not to solicit its customers, not to use its client lists, and not to disclose its confidential information. Those agreements live outside § 181.988, and whether a given clause is enforceable is a separate fight. I covered what employers are using instead at /news/minnesota-employee-noncompete-alternatives/, the limits on NDAs at /news/minnesota-employment-nda-limits/, and trade secrets at /news/minnesota-trade-secrets-act-guide/.

And Cook’s clause had a word in it worth a second look in Minnesota. It didn’t just bar soliciting. It barred accepting business. A clause that stops you from taking a client’s call when the client finds you on her own starts to look like a restriction on “work for another employer in a capacity that is similar”. The words of subdivision 1(a) don’t settle which side of the line that falls on.

I work in Minnesota, and my contract says Texas law. Now what?

This is the question that matters to every Minnesotan working for a company headquartered in Dallas or Houston. Minnesota answered it in the same statute:

(a) An employer must not require an employee who primarily resides and works in Minnesota, as a condition of employment, to agree to a provision in an agreement or contract that would do either of the following:

(1) require the employee to adjudicate outside of Minnesota a claim arising in Minnesota; or

(2) deprive the employee of the substantive protection of Minnesota law with respect to a controversy arising in Minnesota.

— Minn. Stat. § 181.988, subd. 3(a)

A provision that breaks that rule “is voidable at any time by the employee”, and if the employee voids it, “the matter shall be adjudicated in Minnesota and Minnesota law shall govern the dispute.” Subd. 3(b). Adjudication “includes litigation and arbitration.” Subd. 3(d). There’s a second fee sentence, identical to the first. Subd. 3(c).

Two limits, both in the text. You have to primarily reside and work in Minnesota; someone who lives in Hudson and works in Minneapolis doesn’t fit those words on their face. And “This subdivision applies only to claims arising under this section.” Subd. 3(e). It protects you on the noncompete. It doesn’t, by itself, knock out the Texas clause for the nonsolicit or the NDA in the same contract. I wrote about how Minnesota has been building statutes like this one industry at a time at /news/minnesota-choice-of-law-you-cannot-export/.

Texas invented this argument

This one surprised me. The best authority for why a Texas court should respect a Minnesota worker’s noncompete ban comes from Texas.

A Florida security company hired a manager to run its Houston office, under a noncompete providing “that any questions concerning interpretation or enforcement of this contract shall be governed by Florida law.” When he left, he invested in a company that sold security electronics and started his own security-consulting and guard company. Within six months, one of Wackenhut’s clients, Marathon Oil, had moved its contract to the new company, and in October 1984 Wackenhut sued him and the company in Texas. The trial court applied Florida law, cut the covenant’s territory from forty Texas counties to thirteen, and enjoined him. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 675–76 (Tex. 1990). In June 1990, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed: “We hold that Texas law, not Florida law, applies in this case”. Id. at 675. Why? “We likewise conclude that the law governing enforcement of noncompetition agreements is fundamental policy in Texas, and that to apply the law of another state to determine the enforceability of such an agreement in the circumstances of a case like this would be contrary to that policy.” Id. at 681.

Then in 2015 the same argument came back across the border, pointed the other way. Prosperity Bank, a Texas bank, bought a bank whose senior lenders worked in Tulsa, and the lenders signed contracts with a noncompete, a nonsolicit, and a Texas choice-of-law clause. When they left, the fight landed in federal court in Houston. Cardoni v. Prosperity Bank, 805 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit opened with a line about the Red River: “Texas and Oklahoma do not see eye to eye on a less prominent issue: covenants not to compete.” Id. at 576. Oklahoma voids noncompetes by statute, with exceptions for the sale of goodwill and the dissolution of a partnership. Id. at 586. Applying Texas’s own choice-of-law rules, including DeSantis, the court agreed that applying Texas law, “which takes a more permissive attitude of both noncompetition agreements and the ability to reform them, would contravene Oklahoma’s statutory aversion to noncompetition agreements.” Id. at 586.

But not the nonsolicit. “We see no indication that Oklahoma’s policy concerning nonsolicitation agreements rises to the level of a fundamental one that would be violated by applying the parties’ chosen Texas law to the covenant.” Id. at 587. The court held the Texas clause was likely unenforceable as to the noncompetes and likely enforceable as to the nonsolicits, at the preliminary-injunction stage. Id. at 589.

That’s exactly the split § 181.988, subdivision 3(e) builds in. On my reading, a Minnesota worker has a stronger hand than the Tulsa lenders did, because Minnesota’s Legislature didn’t stop at voiding the contracts. It wrote the choice-of-law rule down too. But a Texas court still applies its own conflict-of-laws rules, and a forum clause sending you to Harris County is a fight you’d rather have in Hennepin County. That’s what subdivision 3(b) is for.

Didn’t the federal government ban noncompetes?

It tried. On May 7, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission published a rule that would have made it an unfair method of competition to, among other things, enter into noncompetes with workers on or after September 4, 2024. 91 Fed. Reg. 6507, 6508 (Feb. 12, 2026). A federal district court in the Northern District of Texas held the rule unlawful and set it aside. Id. On September 5, 2025, the Commission voted 3 to 1 to dismiss its appeals and accede to the vacatur, and on February 12, 2026 it removed the rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 6508, 6510.

So the nationwide ban died in a Texas courtroom. In Minnesota, it didn’t matter. The state ban was already on the books.

The scorecard

Minnesota, for the worker. Not close.

Texas starts from “enforceable”, lets the employer write as broadly as it wants, and then orders the judge to cut the covenant down to size and enforce it. Its consolations are real: the employer carries the burden of proof on an employment covenant, gets no damages for a breach that came before a rewrite and nothing but an injunction after one, and on a covenant signed or renewed since September 1, 2025, can’t hold a doctor, dentist, nurse, or physician assistant to more than one year and five miles. Minnesota voids every employee noncompete signed on or after July 1, 2023, lets the employee get fees for fighting one, and won’t let an out-of-state clause take that away from someone who primarily lives and works here.

The concession: Minnesota’s ban doesn’t reach the nonsolicit, the client-list restriction, or the NDA, and a noncompete signed before July 1, 2023 still gets a reasonableness test.

In Texas, a bad noncompete gets a second draft. In Minnesota, it doesn’t get a first one.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC advises Minnesota employees and employers on post-employment restrictions, trade-secret exposure, and the covenant structure in business sales, and we handle the contract and business-tort fights that follow (more on our business litigation page). If you’re holding a noncompete from a company headquartered somewhere else, find the date you signed it and the choice-of-law and forum clauses before you do anything else. Then send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 181.988, subd. 1(a), (c) (definitions; covenant not to compete; carve-outs for nondisclosure, trade-secret, and nonsolicitation agreements; independent contractors), subd. 2(a)–(d) (void and unenforceable; sale and dissolution exceptions; other provisions survive; attorney fees), subd. 3(a)–(e) (choice of law and venue; voidable; adjudication in Minnesota under Minnesota law; fees; litigation and arbitration; limited to claims under the section) (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2026 Minnesota Statutes); 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 53, art. 6, § 1 (enactment; effective July 1, 2023, for contracts and agreements entered into on or after that date; signed May 24, 2023). Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88–89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Caselaw Access Project). Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.05(a) (restraint of trade); § 15.50(a), (b)(2), (b)(4), (d) (criteria for enforceability; physician buyout, one-year, five-mile limits; involuntary discharge without good cause); § 15.501(a)–(b) (dentists, nurses, physician assistants); § 15.51(b)–(c) (burden; mandatory reformation; no pre-reformation damages; fees to promisor); § 15.52 (preemption) (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council); S.B. 1318, 89th Leg., R.S., §§ 1–5 (Tex. 2025) (enrolled bill; struck “reasonable price” buyout; applicability to covenants entered into or renewed on or after September 1, 2025; vote certificates) (Texas Legislature Online). Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 766–67, 772, 778–79 (Tex. 2011); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 675–76, 681 (Tex. 1990); Cardoni v. Prosperity Bank, 805 F.3d 573, 576–77, 586–87, 589 (5th Cir. 2015) (Caselaw Access Project). Federal Trade Commission, Revision of the Negative Option Rule, Withdrawal of the CARS Rule, Removal of the Non-Compete Rule To Conform These Rules to Federal Court Decisions, 91 Fed. Reg. 6507, 6508, 6510 (Feb. 12, 2026) (FederalRegister.gov). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, with Texas and federal law for comparison. It is not legal advice, reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied.

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