Every summary of Minnesota’s cohabitation statute says the same thing: if you live together without marrying, any agreement about property or money has to be in writing and signed, or a Minnesota court cannot hear the claim at all.
That is what the statute says. It is not what happened in the only two cases in which the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied it.
In In re Estate of Eriksen, the court affirmed a one-half constructive trust in a house for a woman whose partner held sole title and who had no written agreement. In In re Estate of Palmen, the court reinstated a $48,051.03 claim against a deceased partner’s estate brought by a woman who also had no written agreement — reversing both the district court and the Court of Appeals, which had thrown it out for lack of jurisdiction. The same day, in Obert v. Dahl, it affirmed the reinstatement of a $27,000 claim by another partner with, again, nothing in writing.
The writing requirement is real, and it is also not the thing that decides these cases. What decides them is whether the claim rests on the cohabitation or on something the claimant put in independently. Understanding that distinction is the difference between a partner who recovers what she paid for and a partner who spends ten years building a household and leaves with nothing.
What do §§ 513.075 and 513.076 actually say?
Both sections are short, and both have been on the books unamended since 1980.
Minn. Stat. § 513.075:
If sexual relations between the parties are contemplated, a contract between a man and a woman who are living together in this state out of wedlock, or who are about to commence living together in this state out of wedlock, is enforceable as to terms concerning the property and financial relations of the parties only if:
(1) the contract is written and signed by the parties; and
(2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship.
Minn. Stat. § 513.076:
Unless the individuals have executed a contract complying with the provisions of section 513.075, the courts of this state are without jurisdiction to hear and shall dismiss as contrary to public policy any claim by an individual to the earnings or property of another individual if the claim is based on the fact that the individuals lived together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock within or without this state.
Four features of that text do work that most descriptions of the statute leave out.
Section 513.076 is jurisdictional, not merely a defense. A court “shall dismiss” — the bar is not waivable by the parties’ conduct and can be raised at any point, including on the court’s own initiative.
Section 513.076 reaches conduct outside Minnesota. The bar applies where the individuals lived together “within or without this state.” Section 513.075, by contrast, speaks only of parties “living together in this state” or “about to commence living together in this state.” A couple who cohabited in another state and litigates here is inside § 513.076’s language and outside § 513.075’s.
The trigger is what the claim is based on. Section 513.076 bars a claim “if the claim is based on the fact that the individuals lived together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock.” It does not bar every claim between two people who happened to live together. This clause is the entire exception, and the case law below is about how far it runs.
And § 513.075 has two numbered requirements, not one.
The requirement nobody reads: you cannot enforce the agreement while you are still together
Clause (2) of § 513.075 provides that a cohabitation contract is enforceable as to property and financial terms only if “enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship.”
Read that as written. A validly executed, signed, fully negotiated Minnesota cohabitation agreement is, as to its property and financial terms, unenforceable while the parties are still living together. The statute conditions enforceability on the relationship having ended.
That has consequences a drafter should think about before the document is signed:
- A partner who breaches the agreement mid-relationship — refusing to make an agreed contribution, refusing to convey a promised interest, encumbering property the agreement said would be held jointly — is not, on the face of clause (2), subject to a suit to enforce the property terms until the relationship terminates.
- A specific-performance or accounting remedy that depends on the relationship continuing is a remedy the statute’s text does not make available.
- The practical protection during the relationship comes from the ownership structure the agreement creates — deeds, titles, account registrations, security interests — not from the promise the agreement records. A signed promise to add a partner to title is worth much less than a deed that already adds her.
This is the single most useful drafting point in this area, and it is right there in clause (2).
How did Eriksen win without a writing?
Because her claim was not based on the cohabitation. In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983), is the origin of the exception.
Pamela Potvin and Jorgen Eriksen lived together from 1977. In 1979 they agreed to buy a house together — as the court put it, “to provide them with shelter and to be an investment for both of them” — with title in Eriksen’s name alone and Eriksen alone signing the $49,000 purchase-money mortgage. They did it that way for two specific reasons: Potvin was still legally married though separated, so record title in her name would have created inchoate rights in her estranged husband and a mortgage would have required his consent; and she had been told she could lose supplemental AFDC benefits if she took a legal interest in the property. Id. at 672. They shared the mortgage principal, interest, late charges, homeowner’s insurance, taxes, utilities, and the premiums on a decreasing-term life policy. When Eriksen died in 1981, that policy paid $48,334.63 against the mortgage. Id. at 672, 674. They never signed an agreement about any of it.
The estate argued § 513.075 barred enforcement absolutely. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “[t]hese statutes are in pari materia, and we conclude that they do not operate to deprive the probate court of jurisdiction in this case.” Id. at 673. The sections
were not intended to apply to the facts of this case where the claimant does not seek to assert any rights in the property of a cohabitant but to preserve and protect her own property, which she acquired for cash consideration wholly independent of any service contract related to cohabitation.
Id. at 674. And the operative rule: “Although they lived together ‘out of wedlock’ and ‘in contemplation of sexual relations,’ their sexual relationship did not provide the sole consideration for the agreement.” Id. at 674. Potvin’s claim, the court said, “is similar to the claim made by a joint venturer or partner.” Id.
The remedy was a constructive trust, and the court rejected the estate’s argument that one required proof of fraud: “The probate court, however, correctly found that fraud need not be present in order to impose a constructive trust. The court must only be persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the imposition of a constructive trust is justified to prevent unjust enrichment.” Id.
Eriksen is a Marvin-era case — the opinion explains that the Legislature enacted both sections in 1980 in response to the California decision in Marvin v. Marvin, which had enforced an oral agreement between unmarried cohabitants to pool earnings. Id. at 673. Minnesota’s answer was to require a writing where the relationship itself is the consideration, and Eriksen holds that where it is not, the answer does not apply.
Did Eriksen survive? Palmen and Obert, decided the same day in 1999
Yes, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed it emphatically after sixteen years of lower-court narrowing.
By the late 1990s the Court of Appeals had built a line of decisions distinguishing Eriksen or declining to follow its reading. In In re Estate of Palmen, 574 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. App. 1998), a 2-1 panel affirmed summary judgment against a cohabitant’s claim on the ground that, under the two statutes, unwritten contracts between unmarried cohabitants living together in contemplation of sexual relations are unenforceable in Minnesota.
The Supreme Court reversed. In re Estate of Palmen, 588 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1999).
Deborah Schneider and John Palmen lived together for more than ten years. In 1987 they agreed to build a log cabin on land belonging solely to Palmen. Schneider claimed she spent $5,991.03 on materials, supplies, and tools, $7,100 erecting portions of the cabin, $4,590 in mileage, and 3,037 hours of labor valued at $10 an hour — $48,051.03 in all. No instrument was ever executed recognizing an ownership interest, and the financial arrangements were never reduced to writing. Id. at 495–96. Palmen died by suicide weeks after they separated.
The court stated the statutory rule and its limit in the same breath:
Under the plain language of the two statutes, a contract between a man and woman living together in this state out of wedlock in contemplation of sexual relations is not enforceable unless the contract is written, and signed by the parties and the parties seek to enforce it after the relationship has terminated. Further, absent a written contract, Minnesota courts are without jurisdiction to hear such claims. In contrast, a claim by an individual to recover, preserve, or protect his or her own property, which he or she acquired “independent of any service contract related to cohabitation,” is enforceable in this state.
Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted). It then read Eriksen as a holding, not dicta: “in In re Eriksen, we explicitly held that the jurisdictional bar imposed by sections 513.075 and 513.076 applies only when the ‘sole consideration for a contract between cohabiting parties is their contemplation of sexual relations * * * out of wedlock.’” Id.
The test the court supplied is disjunctive:
If the claimant can establish that his or her claim is based on an agreement supported by consideration independent of the couple’s “living together in contemplation of sexual relations * * * out of wedlock” or that he or she is seeking to “protect [his or] her own property” and is not “seek[ing] to assert any rights in the property of a cohabitant,” the statutes do not operate to bar the claim.
Id. at 496.
And then the sentence that states what the statutes are actually for:
Put simply, Minn.Stat. §§ 513.075 and 513.076 prevent an unmarried couple living together in “contemplation of sexual relations” from receiving the legal rights conferred upon married couples. In other words, by virtue of living together in contemplation of sexual relations, neither cohabitant obtains any ownership interest or legal right to the other individual’s property or earnings. … At the same time, the statutes do not operate to automatically divest unmarried couples living together of all legal remedies.
Id.
Schneider’s claim survived because of what it did not include: “She does not seek to recover the value of general contributions she made to the relationship she had with Palmen nor does she make any claim on Palmen’s earnings or to his property.” Id. On remand, the court said, “Schneider is in the same position as any other individual seeking to recover on the theory of unjust enrichment.” Id. at 497. That is the doctrinal destination — unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, with all their ordinary elements and limits, not a family-law remedy.
The same day, the court decided Obert v. Dahl, 587 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1999), in three sentences: “The legal issue presented in this case is identical to the legal issue presented in In re Estate of Palmen … Based on our reasoning in Palmen the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.” Id. at 845.
The affirmed Court of Appeals decision is worth reading for the facts. Mary Obert put roughly $27,000 into a house titled solely in Bradley Dahl’s name — including a down payment on the lot, house plans, a construction-loan payment, and the down payment on the house, plus payments retiring Dahl’s boat loan, credit cards, and dissolution attorney fees so he could qualify for financing. She withdrew $6,400 from retirement savings to do it. Her name was to go on title after closing; it never did; the relationship ended three months after they moved in. Obert v. Dahl, 574 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1998). On those facts, the Court of Appeals held it was “unclear whether, as Eriksen requires, the ‘sole’ consideration for the parties’ unwritten agreement was their sexual relations,” and that “Obert has presented material fact questions as to whether the anti-palimony statutes should apply.” Id. at 750. Summary judgment reversed.
The lesson from all three: the jurisdictional bar of § 513.076 is a question about the basis of the claim, and where the facts are disputed it is not a summary-judgment question at all.
Where the line actually falls: what loses
The contrast case is Roatch v. Puera, 534 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. App. 1995).
Sandra Roatch and Kevin Puera lived together about ten years and had two children. All real and personal property was in Puera’s name. Roatch’s “primary responsibilities were house chores and child care”; Puera ran a construction business from the same premises and provided financially. She deposited her part-time earnings in her own account and spent them as she saw fit for herself and the family. The district court, on implied-contract and unjust-enrichment theories, awarded her roughly a third of Puera’s net worth — a car and a $16,000 lien on the home.
The Court of Appeals reversed that award entirely. On Eriksen, it said: “Eriksen represents a narrow factual exception to the statutory requirement of a written contract governing finances for nonmarried couples in Minnesota.” Id. at 564. And on the facts:
Unlike Eriksen, Roatch is not trying to preserve and protect her property. Roatch did not contribute financially to the purchase of the car or the home. Both the home and car were titled in Puera’s name. Roatch contributed only minimally to the operation of Puera’s business. There was no understanding that the property was owned jointly and the parties executed no written agreement concerning distribution of their property.
Id.
Ten years, two children, and a decade of household labor produced no property interest. What Potvin, Schneider, and Obert had that Roatch did not was traceable money into a specific asset and, in Potvin’s case, a documented reason why title was in one name.
Two cautions about Roatch. It predates the Supreme Court’s 1999 correction in Palmen, and its broadest sentence — that a claim to division of property is barred by the plain meaning of § 513.075 whenever there is no written contract — is stated more absolutely than Palmen permits. Read it for its facts: no financial contribution to the specific asset, sole title in the other party, no evidence of a joint-ownership understanding.
And note what Roatch did not disturb. Her paternity judgment and $750-per-month child support award were affirmed in the same opinion. Id. at 564–65. Sections 513.075 and 513.076 have nothing to do with children. Paternity, custody, parenting time, and child support are governed by entirely separate chapters and are unaffected by the parents’ marital status or by the absence of a cohabitation agreement.
Why does the statute still say “a man and a woman”?
Because no one has amended it since 1980, and the rest of the code has moved on around it.
- Section 517.01 now provides that “[a] civil marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between two persons” — amended to that language by Laws 2013, ch. 74, § 2.
- Section 519.11, subd. 1(a), now provides that “[t]wo individuals of legal age may enter into an antenuptial agreement prior to the solemnization of marriage” — as revised by Laws 2024, ch. 101, art. 3, § 1.
- Section 513.075 still reads “a contract between a man and a woman who are living together in this state out of wedlock.” Its history line shows one source act: Laws 1980, ch. 553, § 1.
- Section 513.076, enacted the same day, is written in neutral terms throughout — “the individuals,” “any claim by an individual to the earnings or property of another individual.”
So the enabling section and the barring section do not use the same vocabulary, and the barring section conditions itself on compliance with the enabling section. We are not aware of a published Minnesota decision resolving how §§ 513.075 and 513.076 apply to a same-sex couple, and we are not going to guess at one here.
The practical response does not depend on the answer. Draft the agreement to satisfy § 513.075 on its face — written, signed by both, enforcement contemplated after termination — and build the underlying facts so that the claim would survive under Eriksen and Palmen regardless: independent consideration, traceable contributions, and ownership documents that match the intent. A well-built file does not need the ambiguity resolved.
What an unmarried partner does not get, no matter how long the relationship lasts
This is the part clients most often have backwards, and Palmen states the principle: by virtue of living together, “neither cohabitant obtains any ownership interest or legal right to the other individual’s property or earnings.” 588 N.W.2d at 496.
No common-law marriage. Section 517.01 requires a license, two witnesses, and solemnization, and provides that “[m]arriages subsequent to April 26, 1941, not so contracted shall be null and void.” Minnesota does not create a marriage out of duration.
No spousal maintenance. “Maintenance” is defined as “an award made in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a. No marriage, no dissolution proceeding, no maintenance — regardless of who gave up a career.
No marital-property division, and no homemaker presumption. “Marital property” means property acquired by the parties “to a dissolution, legal separation, or annulment proceeding at any time during the existence of the marriage relation between them.” § 518.003, subd. 3b. And § 518.58, subd. 1, which directs a just and equitable division, contains the sentence that does the heavy lifting in a divorce: “It shall be conclusively presumed that each spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of income and property while they were living together as spouses.” That presumption is available only to spouses. An unmarried partner must prove every contribution she claims. This is the specific mechanism that produced the result in Roatch. For what the divorce framework looks like on the other side of the line, see marital vs. nonmarital property.
Nothing on intestacy. Section 524.2-102 gives an intestate share to a “surviving spouse.” Section 524.2-103 then distributes the rest — or the whole estate if there is no surviving spouse — to descendants, then parents, then descendants of parents, then grandparents and their descendants, then next of kin. A surviving partner appears nowhere in that order. A partner of thirty years is a legal stranger to the estate. See Minnesota intestate succession.
No elective share. Section 524.2-202(a) gives a right of election against the augmented estate to “[t]he surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this state.” A partner has no such right — which means a will leaving her nothing is simply effective.
And no automatic right to the house. How title is held is what decides survivorship between unmarried partners; see joint tenancy vs. tenancy in common. That is also why both leading cases in this area were claims against an estate rather than property disputes: when the partner with title dies, the survivor is a creditor, and creditor claims in probate carry their own short deadlines.
What a Minnesota cohabitation agreement should actually do
A cohabitation agreement is easier to execute than a prenuptial agreement — § 513.075 requires only that it be written and signed by the parties, where an antenuptial agreement must satisfy the procedural- and substantive-fairness requirements of § 519.11, subds. 1b and 1c. That relative informality is not an advantage. It means the document has to do more work on its own.
1. Recite consideration independent of the relationship. This is the single most important paragraph. Eriksen and Palmen turn on whether cohabitation was the sole consideration. Say what each party is actually exchanging: capital, labor at a stated rate, assumption of a debt, forbearance. Do not describe the agreement as being made “in consideration of the parties’ relationship.”
2. Identify each asset and who owns it, by name and by percentage. Not categories. Address, VIN, account number, entity and membership percentage.
3. Match the title documents to the agreement, at signing. A deed, a title transfer, an account registration, an operating-agreement amendment. Because of § 513.075(2), the promise may not be enforceable until the relationship ends; the conveyance is effective now. If title cannot be changed for a documented reason — a credit or financing problem, a pending dissolution, a benefits eligibility issue — write the reason into the agreement. That is exactly the fact that mattered in Eriksen, and its absence is exactly what the Court of Appeals contrasted in Obert.
4. Create a contribution ledger and require that it be maintained. Palmen’s claimant recovered because she could itemize $5,991.03 in materials, $7,100 in erection costs, $4,590 in mileage, and 3,037 hours. Roatch could not itemize anything into a specific asset. Build the record while the parties are still cooperating.
5. Address debt as carefully as property. Who signed, who pays, what happens to a jointly signed obligation on separation, and whether one party indemnifies the other.
6. State what happens on death separately from what happens on separation. The agreement does not make anyone an heir. Wills, beneficiary designations, transfer-on-death deeds, and account registrations do that, and they need to be executed at the same sitting or the estate plan and the agreement will contradict each other.
7. Name the effective date of “termination of the relationship.” Section 513.075(2) makes enforceability turn on it. Define it — written notice, a date of separate residence, some objective event — rather than leaving it to be litigated.
8. Use separate counsel. Section 513.075 does not require it. A court asked years later whether the deal was the product of an arm’s-length exchange will care about it anyway.
9. Do not try to contract around child support or custody. Sections 513.075 and 513.076 do not reach children, and neither does a private agreement.
Two more points on this last piece. These statutes sit inside chapter 513, Minnesota’s statute of frauds — and they are the provision in that chapter where the writing requirement falls hardest on the party with the fewest assets and the least reason to have papered anything. And because § 513.076 is jurisdictional, it is not something the better-positioned party can waive by silence. Expect it to be raised.
The observation
Minnesota’s answer to Marvin was to require a writing. What it produced, over forty-six years, is a body of law in which the writing is almost never the thing being litigated — because couples who paper their finances rarely end up in court over them, and the couples who end up in court almost never papered anything.
So the real question in every one of these cases is the one Eriksen framed and Palmen restated: is this claim about the relationship, or is it about money that came out of one person’s pocket and went into an asset titled in the other’s name? The first is barred. The second is an ordinary unjust-enrichment claim, and the statutes, in the Supreme Court’s words, “do not operate to automatically divest unmarried couples living together of all legal remedies.”
The practical implication runs the other way from how the statute is usually described. The document matters — but the deed, the ledger, and the paper trail showing where the money came from matter more, because they are what preserves the claim if the document was never signed.
Madgett Law, LLC advises unmarried Minnesota couples on cohabitation and property agreements, and represents partners asserting or defending property and contribution claims after a relationship ends or a partner dies — including constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and creditor claims in probate. If you are buying a home with someone you are not married to, or trying to recover what you put into one, send us a message or call 612-470-6529.
Sources: Minn. Stat. § 513.075 (cohabitation; property and financial agreements — the two conjunctive requirements, “(1) the contract is written and signed by the parties; and (2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship”; history line “1980 c 553 s 1”); § 513.076 (necessity of contract — jurisdictional bar, “shall dismiss as contrary to public policy,” and the “within or without this state” reach; history line “1980 c 553 s 2”); § 517.01 (civil marriage a “civil contract between two persons”; license, two witnesses, and solemnization required; noncompliant marriages after April 26, 1941 “null and void”; as amended 2013 c 74 s 2); § 518.003, subd. 3a (definition of “maintenance” — dissolution or legal separation, spouse to spouse) and subd. 3b (definition of “marital property” — “during the existence of the marriage relation”); § 518.58, subd. 1 (just and equitable division of marital property; “It shall be conclusively presumed that each spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of income and property while they were living together as spouses”); § 519.11, subd. 1(a) (“[t]wo individuals of legal age may enter into an antenuptial agreement,” valid if it meets the procedural and substantive fairness requirements of subds. 1b and 1c; as revised 2024 c 101 art 3 s 1); § 524.2-102 (intestate share of the surviving spouse); § 524.2-103 (share of heirs other than the surviving spouse — the full order of takers, in which a nonmarital partner does not appear); § 524.2-202(a) (elective share; right of election belongs to “[t]he surviving spouse”) — all from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes. Cases: In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671, 672–74 (Minn. 1983) (facts and reasons for sole title at 672; “in pari materia … do not operate to deprive the probate court of jurisdiction” at 673; “not intended to apply … but to preserve and protect her own property, which she acquired for cash consideration wholly independent of any service contract related to cohabitation” at 674; “their sexual relationship did not provide the sole consideration,” “similar to the claim made by a joint venturer or partner,” and the constructive-trust/clear-and-convincing standard at 674); In re Estate of Palmen, 588 N.W.2d 493, 495–97 (Minn. 1999) (plain-language rule and the “[i]n contrast” sentence at 495; the disjunctive test, the “[p]ut simply” passage, “do not operate to automatically divest,” and the limits of Schneider’s claim at 496; “same position as any other individual seeking to recover on the theory of unjust enrichment” at 497), reversing In re Estate of Palmen, 574 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. App. 1998); Obert v. Dahl, 587 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1999) (affirming on the reasoning of Palmen), affirming Obert v. Dahl, 574 N.W.2d 747, 748, 750 (Minn. App. 1998) (facts of the $27,000 in contributions at 748; “sole” consideration and material fact questions at 750); Roatch v. Puera, 534 N.W.2d 560, 564–65 (Minn. App. 1995) (“narrow factual exception” and the Roatch/Eriksen contrast at 564; child support affirmed at 564–65). Case text and reporter citations were read from the Caselaw Access Project archive at static.case.law, with pin cites taken from star pagination.
This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Whether §§ 513.075 and 513.076 bar a particular claim depends on the facts of the relationship, the source of the contributions, how title is held, and what was documented. No outcome is promised or implied.