A wrongful conviction case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a hard case to build. The plaintiff has to identify a specific constitutional violation, attach it to a specific official, and get past the immunities that protect police officers and prosecutors — years after the fact, with an investigative file the defense controls.
Minnesota offers a second route that skips every one of those problems. Under Minn. Stat. § 590.11 and the Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362 to 611.368, an exonerated person can obtain a monetary award from the State of Minnesota without proving that anyone — officer, prosecutor, lab analyst, or municipality — violated the Constitution or acted wrongfully at all. Nothing in the eligibility provisions of § 590.11 or in the damages provisions of § 611.365 requires proof of fault by any state actor. The question the statute asks is whether the claimant was exonerated and is innocent, not whether someone is to blame.
That is a different question than the one a § 1983 case asks. This article walks the statute from the eligibility petition to the check.
The scheme has two stages, in two different courts
Stage one is a petition in district court for an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration. Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2 directs that the petition “must be brought before the district court where the original conviction was obtained,” that “[t]he state must be represented by the office of the prosecutor that obtained the conviction or the prosecutor’s successor,” and that “[w]ithin 60 days after the filing of the petition, the prosecutor must respond to the petition.”
Stage two is a claim for an award, filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court and decided by a three-member compensation panel. Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 1 provides that “[a] person who receives an order under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to compensation based on exoneration may bring a claim for an award under sections 611.362 to 611.368.” Neither stage is a tort action, and neither one is tried to a jury.
Stage one: who is eligible
Everything turns on two defined terms in § 590.11, subd. 1.
“Exonerated” is defined in subd. 1(b) and has three components. First, a court either “vacated, reversed, or set aside a judgment of conviction on grounds consistent with innocence” with no remaining same-incident felony charges (or with the prosecutor dismissing them), or “ordered a new trial on grounds consistent with innocence” followed by dismissal or acquittal on all same-incident felony charges. Second, “the time for appeal of the order resulting in exoneration has expired or the order has been affirmed and is final.” Third, 60 days must have passed since the reversal or vacatur without the prosecutor refiling same-incident felony charges — or any refiled charges must have been dismissed or resolved by a not-guilty verdict.
“On grounds consistent with innocence” is defined in subd. 1(c) to mean either exoneration “through a pardon or sentence commutation, based on factual innocence,” or exoneration “because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.” The operative phrase is “any evidence of factual innocence,” and it expressly reaches evidence that existed at the time of the original investigation or trial.
Two ways to establish eligibility
Section 590.11, subd. 3 supplies two independent paths. The first is prosecutorial joinder. Under subd. 3(a), an exonerated individual “is eligible for compensation in the interests of justice, if the prosecutor, within 60 days of filing the petition, joins the petition and indicates that it is likely that the original complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought or would have been dismissed with the knowledge of all of the circumstances.” When that happens, “[j]oinder and agreement to compensation based on the interests of justice by the prosecutor shall conclusively establish eligibility for compensation precluding any further proceedings under paragraph (b),” and the court issues the eligibility order described in subd. 7. The petitioner does not have to prove innocence.
The second is a contested proof of innocence. If the prosecutor does not join, subd. 3(b) directs that “the court shall determine if an individual who is exonerated is eligible for compensation based on the establishment of innocence if the petitioner establishes that a crime was not committed or that the crime was not committed by the petitioner.” It adds that “[t]he petitioner’s burden of proof and the procedures set forth in section 590.04, subdivision 3, apply to this proceeding.” Section 590.04, subd. 3 provides that “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court, the burden of proof of the facts alleged in the petition shall be upon the petitioner to establish the facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence.”
A preponderance standard, with the state represented by the office that obtained the conviction, is a real fight — but it is a fight about innocence, not about whether a detective’s conduct violated clearly established law.
The additional elements in subdivision 5
Eligibility under subd. 3 is necessary but not sufficient. Section 590.11, subd. 5(a) adds that a claim arises only if the person “was convicted of a felony and served any part of the imposed sentence”; was exonerated on all same-incident charges; “did not commit or induce another person to commit perjury or fabricate evidence to cause or bring about the conviction”; and “was not serving a term of incarceration for another crime at the same time,” subject to two exceptions for additional time attributable to the challenged conviction.
The felony-and-served-time requirement is a hard gate: a misdemeanor conviction, or a felony conviction on which no part of the sentence was served, does not produce a claim under the plain text of subd. 5(a)(1). The perjury-and-fabrication exclusion, by contrast, is narrower than it first appears. Subdivision 5(c) provides that “[a] confession or admission later found to be false or a guilty plea to a crime the claimant did not commit does not constitute bringing about the claimant’s conviction for purposes of paragraph (a), clause (3).”
Under subd. 4 the court may also weigh the petitioner’s own contributing acts and other same-incident offenses, “except for those acts contained in subdivision 5, paragraph (c),” and the victim of the offense “has a right to submit an oral or written statement before the court issues its order.”
The deadlines
Two short clocks control the whole scheme, and they run in sequence.
The petition. Section 590.11, subd. 2 provides that “[a] petition must be brought within two years, but no less than 60 days after the petitioner is exonerated.” Both ends are operative: filing too early is as fatal as filing too late.
The claim. Section 611.362, subd. 4 provides that “[a] claimant must commence a claim under this section within 60 days after the date the order was issued under section 590.11, subdivision 7, provided that if the person did not receive the notice required under section 590.11, subdivision 7, the person may commence a claim within three years of that date.” That notice — of the right to file a claim, with a copy of §§ 611.362 to 611.368 — is built into the eligibility order itself under subd. 7. The same subdivision adds that “[a]n action by the state challenging or appealing the order under section 590.11 tolls the time in which a claim must be commenced.”
Stage two: the panel
The claim names the State of Minnesota as respondent, is served on the state through the commissioner of management and budget, and is filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court; the state has 60 days to respond and is represented by the attorney general or by counsel for the Department of Management and Budget. Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 2.
Within 30 business days after the claim is filed, “the chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint a compensation panel of three attorneys or judges who are responsible for determining the amount of damages to be awarded,” and panel members “must have experience in legal issues involving the settlement of tort claims and the determination of damages.” Minn. Stat. § 611.363, subd. 1.
The panel may set a prehearing settlement conference at which “the parties must make a good faith attempt to reach a settlement in the case.” Otherwise “the panel must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of damages to be awarded to the claimant,” and hearings and records “are open to the public, except where, in the interest of justice, the panel orders a hearing closed or a record sealed.” Minn. Stat. § 611.364, subds. 1, 2.
What the award consists of
Section 611.365, subd. 2(a) sets a floor and then opens a list. The claimant “is entitled to reimbursement for all restitution, assessments, fees, court costs, and other sums paid by the claimant as required by the judgment and sentence.” On top of that, the claimant “is entitled to monetary damages of not less than $50,000 for each year of incarceration, and not less than $25,000 for each year served on supervised release or as a registered predatory offender, to be prorated for partial years served.”
Those are minimums, not caps. In setting additional monetary damages the panel “shall consider” six enumerated categories: economic damages, including attorney fees, lost wages, and criminal-defense costs; medical and dental expenses, past and future; noneconomic damages for physical and nonphysical injury or sickness caused by the incarceration; tuition and fees for education or skills training, capped at the value of a four-year degree at a public university; child support and interest on arrearages accruing during the time served; and reasonable reintegrative expenses on release, including housing, transportation and subsistence, reintegrative services, and health care.
Subdivision 2(b) adds that “[t]he panel shall award the claimant reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing a claim under sections 611.362 to 611.368 and in obtaining an order of eligibility for compensation based on exoneration under chapter 590” — fees for both stages, on a mandatory “shall,” which is a different posture from § 1988 fee shifting in ordinary civil rights litigation.
Subdivision 3 states that “[t]here is no limit on the aggregate amount of damages that may be awarded under this section,” but caps four of the six categories in combination: damages under clauses (1) and (4) to (6) “are limited to $100,000 per year of incarceration and $50,000 per year served on supervised release or as a registered predatory offender.” Clauses (2) and (3) — medical and dental expenses and noneconomic damages — are not subject to that per-year limit by the terms of subd. 3.
Two more rules cut in the claimant’s favor. Under subd. 6, the award “must not be offset by” government expenses “incurred to secure the claimant’s custody or to feed, clothe, or provide medical services for the claimant.” Under subd. 7, a pending order or claim “survives the death of the petitioner or claimant.”
The catch worth knowing before you start
An award from the panel is not a judgment that can be executed. Minn. Stat. § 611.367 provides that the panel “shall forward an award of damages under section 611.365 to the commissioner of management and budget,” and that “[t]he commissioner shall submit the amount of the award to the legislature for consideration as an appropriation.” The award has to be appropriated — a materially different collection posture than a civil judgment.
Review is available but narrow. Section 611.366 gives a party aggrieved by an award “judicial review of the decision as provided in sections 14.63 to 14.69,” while specifying that the proceedings “are not a contested case within the meaning of chapter 14 and are not otherwise governed by chapter 14.” Separately, § 590.11, subd. 8 allows an appeal from a contested eligibility order under subd. 3(b) but provides that “[t]he petitioner may not appeal an order granting eligibility pursuant to subdivision 3, paragraph (a).”
What it forecloses, and what it does not
The statute does not say that accepting compensation extinguishes a civil rights action. It says two narrower things. Under § 611.365, subd. 4, “[a] claimant’s acceptance of an award, compromise, or settlement must be in writing and is final and conclusive on the claimant” — which closes the compensation proceeding. And under subd. 5, “[a]ny future damages awarded to the claimant resulting from an action by the claimant against the state or a political subdivision of this state based on the same subject must be offset by the damage award received under this section.” That is an offset rule directed at later recoveries against the state or a Minnesota political subdivision — not a release, and not by its terms a bar to filing.
Sequencing therefore matters. The two-year outer limit on a § 590.11 petition and the deadline on a federal wrongful-conviction claim have separate triggers, and neither waits for the other; see the § 1983 limitations period in Minnesota, who can be sued under § 1983, and Brady claims and prosecutorial immunity.
Why the statute reads the way it does
The current text is the Legislature’s second draft. In Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 2017), the Minnesota Supreme Court construed the 2016 definition and held, per its syllabus, that “[a] claimant has not been ‘exonerated’ under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(1)(i) (2016), unless the prosecutor dismisses the charges, even if an appellate court has already reversed or vacated the claimant’s conviction on grounds consistent with innocence.” Where “an appellate court reverses a conviction outright in a case involving only a single charge,” the court held, that dismissal requirement “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it denies eligibility to a class of individuals based on a legally impossible act” — and “[t]he remedy for the as-applied equal-protection violation in this case is to sever Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(1)(i), from the remainder of the statute.”
The Legislature rewrote the section in 2019. Section 590.11 carries the history line “2014 c 269 s 1; 1Sp2019 c 5 art 2 s 13-16,” and subd. 2 now contains a window, since closed, for people caught by the old text: a person who “did not meet both requirements of Minnesota Statutes 2018, section 590.11, subdivision 1, clause (1), item (i), and did not file a petition or the petition was denied” could commence an action “on or after July 1, 2019, and before July 1, 2021.”
The lesson is that these eligibility definitions have been litigated to the Minnesota Supreme Court once already, and they are read according to their terms. A petition that does not track subd. 1 does not reach the damages stage.
Working with Madgett Law
Madgett Law, LLC handles civil rights and police misconduct litigation in Minnesota state and federal court, alongside the firm’s personal injury and general civil litigation practice. If you or a family member has had a Minnesota felony conviction vacated, reversed, or set aside, the compensation statute runs on its own timeline — the petition window and the 60-day claim window run whether or not a federal civil rights case is also in the works. To talk about a specific situation, send us a message or call 612-470-6529.
Sources: Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subds. 1(b), 1(c), 2, 3(a), 3(b), 4, 5(a), 5(c), 7, 8; Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3; Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subds. 1, 2, 4; Minn. Stat. § 611.363, subd. 1; Minn. Stat. § 611.364, subds. 1, 2; Minn. Stat. § 611.365, subds. 2(a), 2(b), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; Minn. Stat. § 611.366; Minn. Stat. § 611.367; Minn. Stat. § 611.368; Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 2017) (A15-1637), syllabus paragraphs 1–3. All statutory text was retrieved from the Office of the Revisor of Statutes at revisor.mn.gov; the Back opinion was retrieved from the Minnesota State Law Library appellate opinion archive at mn.gov. None of the sections cited carried a notice of amendment by the 2026 Regular Session as of the date of this article.
This article is general information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and it promises no particular outcome in any matter. Every case depends on its own facts.