Minnesota's Franchise Act Is a Disclosure Statute With a Termination Statute Hidden Inside It

Read the Minnesota Franchise Act front to back and the first impression is that it is a securities statute wearing different clothes. Registration. A public offering statement. A commissioner who can deny, suspend, and revoke. Prohibited practices phrased in the language of Rule 10b-5. Criminal penalties for willful violations.

All of that is real, and almost none of it is what walks into a lawyer’s office.

What walks in is a franchisee who got a letter. The letter says the franchise agreement is terminated, or that it will not be renewed when the term expires, or that the franchisor will not consent to the sale the franchisee has already negotiated. The franchise agreement says the franchisor may do exactly that. And the franchisee wants to know whether the agreement is the last word.

In Minnesota it is not — because sitting in the middle of a disclosure statute, at Minn. Stat. § 80C.14, is a set of substantive limits on ending a franchise relationship that no franchise agreement can contract around.

First question: is it a franchise?

Everything in chapter 80C turns on this, and the definition is not intuitive. Minn. Stat. § 80C.01, subd. 4(a)(1), defines the core case in three cumulative elements. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated them compactly:

“Under Minnesota law, a franchise is an agreement: (1) by which the franchisee is granted the right to offer or distribute goods using the franchisor’s commercial symbol or related characteristics; (2) in which the parties have a community of interest in the marketing of goods or services; and (3) for which the franchisee pays a franchise fee.”

Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enterprises, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Minn. 1995).

The statutory text is slightly longer and the extra words matter. The grant is “the right to engage in the business of offering or distributing goods or services using the franchisor’s trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising, or other commercial symbol or related characteristics.” The community of interest is “in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or otherwise.” And the fee is one the franchisee pays “directly or indirectly.” § 80C.01, subd. 4(a)(1)(i)–(iii).

Nobody has to call it a franchise. The definition reaches “a contract or agreement, either express or implied, whether oral or written, for a definite or indefinite period.” A reseller agreement, a distributorship, a dealer agreement, a licensing arrangement — the label on the document is not an element.

Three other paths into the statute sit in the same subdivision and are easy to miss: motor vehicle fuel marketed at retail under the franchisor’s marks (§ 80C.01, subd. 4(a)(2)); certain business-opportunity sales of products, equipment, or services above $500 where the seller promises to find locations, promises to buy back what the purchaser produces, or guarantees income exceeding the price (subd. 4(a)(3)); and security-system manufacturers who require regular royalty or residual payments from dealers (subd. 4(a)(4)).

The franchise fee is the element that gets litigated

“Franchise fee” is defined expansively at § 80C.01, subd. 9: “any fee or charge that a franchisee or subfranchisor is required to pay or agrees to pay for the right to enter into a business or to continue a business under a franchise agreement,” including lump sums, installments, “an initial capital investment fee,” percentage-of-sales charges “whether or not referred to as royalty fees,” “any payment for goods or services,” and training fees.

The exclusions are equally specific, and each is built around the word bona fide: purchases of goods at a bona fide wholesale price; goods on consignment where the franchisee remits only the bona fide wholesale price; repayment of a bona fide loan; purchases at a bona fide retail price under a compensation plan that “in substance reflects only a bona fide wholesale transaction”; and purchases or leases of supplies, fixtures, or real property at fair market value. § 80C.01, subd. 9(a)–(f).

Irie is the case that shows how far the definition reaches. The parties signed two documents: a $125,000 purchase agreement for a software system, and a separate reseller agreement. One of the purchase agreement’s paragraphs said the reseller agreement was “part of the consideration” for the purchase. The Supreme Court held the $125,000 was consideration for both promises, and therefore constituted “a ‘fee * * * that a franchisee * * * agrees to pay for the right to enter into a business’ under the Act.” 530 N.W.2d at 543. A payment nominally made for something else can be the franchise fee.

And watch the paragraph letters

Section 80C.01, subd. 4, excludes several relationships outright, including any agreement “whereby the franchisee is required to pay less than $100 on an annual basis,” with a carve-out for motor vehicle fuel franchises. That exclusion is at paragraph (c) of the current statute. In Irie the Supreme Court analyzed the identical language as “subdivision 4(f)” — because that is where it sat in the 1994 statutes. 530 N.W.2d at 544.

Cite the case for what it holds; check the current paragraph letters before you cite the statute. The Court also declined to read the exclusion broadly, noting that “[t]he Minnesota Franchise Act … is remedial legislation” and that “[w]e interpret exceptions contained within remedial legislation narrowly.” Id. at 543–44, 544.

Other exclusions in subdivision 4: businesses operated under a lease or license on the lessor’s premises and incidental to the lessor’s business — leased departments and concessions (paragraph (b)); new motor vehicle dealerships (paragraph (d), which routes those relationships to a different body of law); air carriers (paragraph (e)); and certain unbranded motor-fuel marketing arrangements (paragraphs (f) and (g)).

The disclosure half of the statute

The registration rule is absolute on its face. “No person may offer or sell any franchise in this state unless there is an effective registration statement on file … or unless the franchise or transaction is exempted under section 80C.03.” § 80C.02. And on any question of coverage, “the burden of proving an exemption or exception from a definition is upon the person claiming it.” § 80C.12, subd. 4.

The exemptions at § 80C.03 are narrow and conditional. The two that come up most: a franchisee’s resale of its own franchise, limited to one sale per franchisor in any 12 consecutive months and not effected by or through the franchisor (paragraph (a)); and a franchisor’s single sale in any 12 months, which is conditioned on no general advertising, on depositing all franchise fees in escrow with a Minnesota bank within two days of receipt until the franchisor’s pre-opening obligations are performed, and on written notice to the commissioner “no later than ten business days prior to the sale” (paragraph (e)). A “fractional franchise” — where the franchisee has been in that line of business more than two years and the parties anticipated the relationship would produce no more than 20% of the franchisee’s dollar sales volume — is also exempt. §§ 80C.03(f), 80C.01, subd. 18.

Chapter 80C reaches out of state. Its provisions apply “when a sale or offer to sell is made in this state; when an offer to purchase is made and accepted in this state; or when the franchise is to be located in this state.” § 80C.19, subd. 1. A franchisor in another state selling a Minnesota location is inside the Act.

The delivery deadline, and the federal one that overrides it

Section 80C.06, subd. 5, requires the seller, at its own expense, to give a prospective franchisee the current public offering statement plus “a copy of all proposed agreements relating to the sale of the franchise” at least seven days before the franchisee signs anything or pays anything, “whichever occurs first.” The franchisee keeps the statement; the seller obtains and retains a signed receipt for three years.

Seven days is not the operative number for most franchise sales. The FTC Franchise Rule makes it “an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act” for a franchisor “to fail to furnish a prospective franchisee with a copy of the franchisor’s current disclosure document … at least 14 calendar-days before the prospective franchisee signs a binding agreement with, or makes any payment to, the franchisor or an affiliate in connection with the proposed franchise sale.” 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a). A separate seven-calendar-day period applies where the franchisor unilaterally and materially alters the agreements. § 436.2(b).

Minnesota anticipated the overlap: the commissioner “may by rule or order deem to be in full or partial compliance” with §§ 80C.04 and 80C.06 “any public offering or similar statement which complies with the requirements of any federal law or administrative rule or with the law of any other state requiring substantially the same disclosure of information as is required under sections 80C.01 to 80C.22.” § 80C.06, subd. 4.

The practical rule: fourteen days is the floor, and the Minnesota seven-day period is not a safe harbor against it.

Section 80C.13 supplies the antifraud provisions — no untrue statements of material fact or material omissions in filings (subd. 1), the same standard for “any written or oral communication” used to offer or sell a franchise in Minnesota (subd. 2), and a prohibition on telling a prospect that a filing or registration means the commissioner passed on the merits (subd. 3).

The termination statute inside the disclosure statute

Now the part that matters when the letter arrives.

Section 80C.14 declares a category — “unfair and inequitable” practices — and then fills it in twice: once by rule, and once in the statute itself.

Subdivision 1 makes it unlawful to “engage in any unfair or inequitable practice in contravention of such rules as the commissioner may adopt defining as to franchises the words ‘unfair and inequitable’” — and authorizes the commissioner to “specifically recognize classifications of franchises,” expressly including motor vehicle fuel, motor vehicle, hardware, “and franchises which require that the franchisee make an initial, unfinanced investment in excess of $200,000.”

Subdivision 2 then does the statutory work: “All franchise contracts or agreements, other than those classifications of franchises specifically recognized by the commissioner under subdivision 1, and any other device or practice of a franchisor must conform to subdivisions 3 and 4. It is an unfair and inequitable practice for a person to commit an act specified in subdivisions 3 to 5.”

Note the carve-out in the middle of that sentence. Whether a particular franchise sits inside a classification the commissioner has “specifically recognized” is a threshold question, and motor fuel franchises in particular are governed by their own sections — §§ 80C.144 through 80C.147, covering alternative compliance for exempt motor fuel franchises, a right of survivorship, a prohibition on eliminating service bays, and change of ownership.

Termination: 90 days, then 60 days to cure

Section 80C.14, subd. 3(a), sets a two-stage clock. No person may terminate or cancel a franchise unless:

“(i) that person has given written notice setting forth all the reasons for the termination or cancellation at least 90 days in advance of termination or cancellation, and (ii) the recipient of the notice fails to correct the reasons stated for termination or cancellation in the notice within 60 days of receipt of the notice”

Three exceptions make the notice “effective immediately upon receipt”: voluntary abandonment of the franchise relationship by the franchisee; conviction of the franchisee “of an offense directly related to the business conducted pursuant to the franchise”; and failure to cure a default “which materially impairs the good will associated with the franchisor’s trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype or other commercial symbol” after at least 24 hours’ written notice to cure.

Read clause (i) closely. The notice must state all the reasons. A franchisor that terminates for reason A and litigates reason B has a problem the franchise agreement cannot fix.

And there must be good cause

Section 80C.14, subd. 3(b): “No person may terminate or cancel a franchise except for good cause. ‘Good cause’ means failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with the material and reasonable franchise requirements imposed by the franchisor,” including but not limited to the franchisee’s bankruptcy or insolvency; an assignment for the benefit of creditors or similar disposition of the franchise business’s assets; voluntary abandonment; conviction or a plea of guilty or no contest “to a charge of violating any law relating to the franchise business”; or conduct “which materially impairs the good will” associated with the franchisor’s marks.

The definition is franchisee-conduct-based. A franchisor’s change of strategy, a decision to consolidate territories, a national refranchising program, or a better offer from someone else is not good cause under this definition — because none of them is a failure by the franchisee to comply with anything.

Nonrenewal: 180 days, plus a recoupment right

Nonrenewal gets its own rule, and it is the more valuable of the two. Section 80C.14, subd. 4, provides that unless the failure to renew is for good cause as defined in subdivision 3(b) and the franchisee has failed to correct the reasons for termination, no person may fail to renew a franchise unless:

“(1) the franchisee has been given written notice of the intention not to renew at least 180 days in advance of the expiration of the franchise; and (2) the franchisee has been given an opportunity to operate the franchise over a sufficient period of time to enable the franchisee to recover the fair market value of the franchise as a going concern, as determined and measured from the date of the failure to renew.”

And a flat prohibition: “No franchisor may refuse to renew a franchise if the refusal is for the purpose of converting the franchisee’s business premises to an operation that will be owned by the franchisor for its own account.”

Clause (2) is unusual and underused. It is not a notice rule. It is a recoupment right measured in going-concern value, and it means the franchisee’s remedy for a bad nonrenewal is not limited to the 180 days of notice it should have received.

Transfer: consent may not be unreasonably withheld

Section 80C.14, subd. 5: “It is unfair and inequitable for a person to unreasonably withhold consent to an assignment, transfer, or sale of the franchise whenever the franchisee to be substituted meets the present qualifications and standards required of the franchisees of the particular franchisor.”

The qualifier does real work in both directions. The proposed buyer has to meet the franchisor’s present standards. If it does, “we would rather own this location ourselves” is not a reason.

The commissioner’s rule adds more than the statute does

Section 80C.14, subd. 1, delegates, and the commissioner used the delegation. Minn. R. 2860.4400 declares thirteen practices unfair and inequitable. It repeats the termination and nonrenewal rules, and then adds items that appear nowhere in the statute:

• Item A — no restricting or inhibiting, “directly or indirectly, the free association among franchisees for any lawful purpose.” Franchisee associations are protected.
• Item C — no competing with the franchisee in, or granting competitive franchises in, an exclusive territory “if the terms of the franchise agreement provide that an exclusive territory has been specifically granted.”
• Item G — no imposing “any standard of conduct that is unreasonable.”
• Item I — no enforcing “any unreasonable covenant not to compete after the franchise relationship ceases to exist.”
• Item J — no requiring a franchisee “to waive his or her rights to a jury trial or to waive rights to any procedure, forum, or remedies provided for by the laws of the jurisdiction, or to consent to liquidated damages, termination penalties, or judgment notes; provided that this part shall not bar an exclusive arbitration clause.”
• Item K — no security deposit “except for the purpose of securing against damage to property, equipment, inventory, or leaseholds.”
• Item L — no requiring or prohibiting changes in the franchisee’s management or personnel unless the people involved fail to meet the franchisor’s present qualifications and standards.

Item J is the one to read twice. Jury-trial waivers, forum selections, liquidated damages, and termination penalties are all named — and arbitration is expressly excepted. That exception is doing a lot of work in modern franchise agreements.

One remedy provision hiding in the definitional section

The last two sentences of § 80C.14, subd. 1, are worth their own heading:

“A violation of this section is enjoinable by a court of competent jurisdiction. Irreparable harm to the franchisee will be presumed if there is a violation of this section by a person who is required to register under section 80C.02, but who fails to do so.

A temporary injunction may be granted under this section without requiring the posting of any bond or security. A bond or security is required if a temporary restraining order is granted.“

An unregistered franchisor that commits an unfair practice hands the franchisee a presumption of irreparable harm — the element that ordinarily sinks injunction motions — and the franchisee can obtain a temporary injunction without posting a bond.

A 2026 amendment to the registration grounds, already in force

Section 80C.12, subd. 1 — the list of grounds on which the commissioner may deny, suspend, or revoke a registration — was amended by Laws 2026, ch. 124, art. 2, § 4. Two changes matter.

First, the paragraphs were renumbered. What were paragraphs (a) through (g) are now clauses (1) through (7). The substance of six of them is unchanged, but a citation to a lettered paragraph of subdivision 1 is now a citation to the prior version, and the published statutes may still display the letters for a time — the Revisor publishes the preceding edition with a banner flagging the pending change. If you are citing this subdivision, work from the session law.

Second, and substantively, the person-related ground was narrowed. Former paragraph (d) reached a person identified in a public offering statement with a qualifying conviction, civil judgment, pending action, or order under § 80C.04, subd. 1(e). As amended, clause (4) requires two things: that history, and

the involvement of the person in the business of the applicant or franchisor creates a substantial risk to prospective franchisees.

That is a second element the commissioner did not previously have to establish on this ground. A franchisor whose principal has a qualifying history is no longer exposed on that basis alone; the question becomes what role that person actually plays in the business. For a franchisor with a colorful officer, that is a meaningful change. For a prospective franchisee reading a public offering statement, it means a disclosed history is now less likely, standing alone, to have triggered regulatory action.

On timing: article 2 of chapter 124 ends at § 4 and contains no effective-date clause. Under Minn. Stat. § 645.02, “[a]n appropriation act or an act having appropriation items … takes effect at the beginning of the first day of July next following its final enactment, unless a different date is specified in the act,” and chapter 124 contains appropriation items. Confirm the operative date against the session law before relying on it either way.

Remedies: § 80C.17, and the clock on it

Section 80C.17, subd. 1, is broad: “A person who violates any provision of this chapter or any rule or order thereunder shall be liable to the franchisee or subfranchisor who may sue for damages caused thereby, for rescission, or other relief as the court may deem appropriate.”

Four features:

• Rescission is a named remedy, not an equitable argument you have to build.
• Control persons are jointly and severally liable. “Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under subdivision 1, every partner in a firm so liable, every principal executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions and every employee of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or transaction constituting the violation is also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such person” — with an escape for a person who “had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to know of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.” Subd. 2.
• Fees and costs are recoverable by the plaintiff. A suit may be brought “to recover the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff together with costs and disbursements plus reasonable attorney’s fees.” Subd. 3. That is one-way fee shifting in the franchisee’s favor, and it is what makes a modest franchise case economically viable.
• The private right of action is bounded. “Except as explicitly provided in this section, no civil liability in favor of any private party shall arise against any person by implication from or as a result of the violation of any provision of sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 or any rule or order thereunder.” But the section does not displace other law: “Nothing herein shall limit any liability which may exist by virtue of any other statute or under common law if sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 were not in effect.” Subd. 4.

The limitations period is three years, and it runs from accrual. “No action may be commenced pursuant to this section more than three years after the cause of action accrues.” § 80C.17, subd. 5. That is shorter than Minnesota’s general six-year period for contract and most statutory claims, which is exactly the trap: a franchisee who spends two years negotiating with the franchisor before consulting counsel has spent two-thirds of the statute.

Public enforcement runs alongside. Violations of §§ 80C.02, 80C.06, 80C.09, 80C.13, or 80C.14 carry a civil fine “of not more than $2,000 for each violation,” imposed in an action brought by the attorney general; failure to comply with a final judgment or order carries up to $25,000. § 80C.16, subd. 2. Willful violations are criminal — “fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both” — as is employing “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the offer or sale of any franchise.” Subd. 3.

Section 80C.21: the clause that eats the other clauses

Everything above would be worth much less without this sentence:

“Any condition, stipulation or provision, including any choice of law provision, purporting to bind any person who, at the time of acquiring a franchise is a resident of this state, or, in the case of a partnership or corporation, organized or incorporated under the laws of this state, or purporting to bind a person acquiring any franchise to be operated in this state to waive compliance or which has the effect of waiving compliance with any provision of sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 or any rule or order thereunder is void.”

§ 80C.21. Note the structure. It reaches two categories of person: someone who was a Minnesota resident or a Minnesota entity when the franchise was acquired, and anyone acquiring a franchise “to be operated in this state.” An out-of-state buyer of a Minnesota location is covered.

Note also the phrase “or which has the effect of waiving compliance.” The section does not require the clause to say the word “waive.” A choice-of-law clause selecting a state with no franchise-relationship law has the effect of waiving compliance, and § 80C.21 names choice-of-law provisions expressly. Minn. R. 2860.4400, item J, reaches forum and remedy waivers from the other direction.

Two limits worth stating honestly. Section 80C.21 voids the offending condition; it is not by its terms a rule about which court hears the case. And the rule’s item J carve-out for “an exclusive arbitration clause” means arbitration agreements are treated differently from the other waivers in this area — a distinction with substantial consequences given the reach of federal arbitration law.

If you are a franchisee

1. Test coverage before you argue the merits. Three elements under § 80C.01, subd. 4(a)(1) — marks, community of interest, franchise fee. Look hard for an indirect fee: markups above bona fide wholesale, required purchases at other than fair market value, training charges, “marketing” assessments.
2. Date the letter, and count. Ninety days for termination with a 60-day cure right; 180 days for nonrenewal. § 80C.14, subds. 3–4.
3. Read the notice for what it does not say. Reasons omitted from a termination notice were not properly noticed, because subdivision 3(a)(i) requires “all the reasons.”
4. Ask whether the franchisor was registered. If it was required to register and did not, § 80C.14, subd. 1, gives you a presumption of irreparable harm and a temporary injunction without a bond.
5. On nonrenewal, value the business. Subdivision 4(2) measures the franchisee’s entitlement in fair market value as a going concern.
6. Do not let the three-year clock run while you negotiate. § 80C.17, subd. 5.
7. Ignore the choice-of-law clause until you have read § 80C.21. It may be void.

If you are a franchisor selling in Minnesota

1. Register or fit an exemption precisely — and remember that under § 80C.12, subd. 4, you carry the burden of proving the exemption.
2. Run the federal 14-day clock, not the Minnesota 7-day clock. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a).
3. Write termination notices that state every reason, and calendar the 60-day cure period from receipt.
4. Treat nonrenewal as the harder case. The 180-day notice is the easy part; the going-concern recoupment right in subdivision 4(2) is not.
5. Have a real, written, documented answer to a transfer request. “Unreasonably withhold” is the standard, and silence reads badly.
6. Audit the agreement against Minn. R. 2860.4400. Non-competes, jury waivers, forum clauses, liquidated damages, security deposits, and management-approval provisions are all named there.
7. Assume § 80C.21 will void the choice-of-law clause and draft the substantive terms so they survive Minnesota law.

The observation

Chapter 80C was built on a securities model. Register the offering, deliver the disclosure document, tell the truth, and let the buyer decide. On that model, everything after the sale is contract law.

But franchising is not a securities transaction. The investor cannot sell, cannot diversify, and cannot walk away — the whole investment is a single location operating under someone else’s marks under an agreement the franchisor drafted. Disclosure at the front end does nothing about the letter that arrives in year seven.

So the legislature did something the securities model does not do. It wrote relationship rules into a transaction statute: good cause, a 90-day notice, a 60-day cure, 180 days before nonrenewal, a right to recoup going-concern value, a limit on withholding consent to a sale — and then made the whole package non-waivable and non-exportable.

That is why the interesting part of chapter 80C is not the registration file at the Department of Commerce. It is § 80C.14, and the fact that no franchise agreement in America can contract out of it for a Minnesota franchise.

Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota franchisees and franchisors in termination and nonrenewal disputes, transfer and consent fights, disclosure and registration claims, and the negotiated exits that resolve most of them. If you have received a termination or nonrenewal notice, or you are selling franchises into Minnesota, send us a message or call 612-470-6529.

Related reading: the Minnesota contract terms that are void no matter what you signed, Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes and who actually gets paid under them, the map of Minnesota’s fee-shifting statutes, and how long you have to sue in Minnesota.

Sources: Minn. Stat. ch. 80C (Minnesota Franchise Act), including § 80C.01, subd. 4(a)(1)–(4) and (b)–(g) (definition of franchise and its exclusions, including the $100 annual-payment exclusion at paragraph (c)), subd. 9(a)–(f) (franchise fee and the bona fide exclusions), and subd. 18 (fractional franchise); § 80C.02 (registration requirement); § 80C.03(a), (e), (f) (exemptions); § 80C.06, subd. 4 (commissioner may deem federal or other-state disclosure compliant) and subd. 5 (seven-day delivery of the public offering statement and proposed agreements; signed receipt retained three years); § 80C.12, subd. 1 (grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation, as amended by Laws 2026, ch. 124, art. 2, § 4, renumbering paragraphs (a)–(g) as clauses (1)–(7) and adding to clause (4) the requirement that the person’s involvement create a substantial risk to prospective franchisees) and subd. 4 (burden of proving an exemption or exception is on the person claiming it); § 80C.13, subds. 1–3 (prohibited practices); § 80C.14 (unfair practices), subd. 1 (rulemaking delegation; recognized classifications; injunction; presumed irreparable harm where a person required to register under § 80C.02 fails to do so; temporary injunction without bond, bond required for a temporary restraining order), subd. 2 (conformity requirement and the carve-out for classifications specifically recognized by the commissioner), subd. 3(a)–(b) (90-day notice stating all reasons, 60-day cure, three immediate-effect exceptions, and the good-cause definition), subd. 4 (nonrenewal: 180-day notice, opportunity to recover fair market value as a going concern, and the prohibition on nonrenewal to convert the premises to a franchisor-owned operation), and subd. 5 (unreasonably withholding consent to transfer); §§ 80C.144–80C.147 (motor fuel franchises); § 80C.16, subds. 2–3 (civil fines in an action by the attorney general; criminal penalties); § 80C.17, subds. 1–5 (damages, rescission, and other relief; joint and several liability of control persons; costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; no implied private liability; three-year limitation running from accrual); § 80C.19, subd. 1 (scope, including franchises to be located in this state); and § 80C.21 (waivers void, including any choice of law provision). Minn. R. 2860.4400, items A–M (unfair and inequitable practices), adopted under the authority of Minn. Stat. §§ 45.023, 80C.14, and 80C.18. Federal: 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)–(b) (FTC Franchise Rule; 14 calendar days before signing or payment; seven calendar days for unilateral material alterations). Case: Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enterprises, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539, 542–44 (Minn. 1995) (three-element statement of the Minnesota franchise definition; consideration for one promise may constitute the franchise fee for another; the Act is remedial legislation and its exceptions are interpreted narrowly). Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (effective date of laws). Statutory and rule text retrieved from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, and the text of Laws 2026, ch. 124, art. 2, § 4 from the Revisor’s published session law; the federal rule from the electronic Code of Federal Regulations; the opinion from the Caselaw Access Project scan of 530 N.W.2d. This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Whether chapter 80C applies to a particular relationship, and what remedies are available, depends on the agreements and the facts. No outcome is promised or implied.