Order for Protection or Harassment Restraining Order? Choosing the Right One in Minnesota

Most people arrive at the courthouse describing what happened to them. The statutes ask a different question first: who is the other person to you? That single fact — not how frightening the conduct was, not how many times it happened — decides whether you file a petition for an Order for Protection under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 or a Harassment Restraining Order under Minn. Stat. § 609.748. And that choice, made in the first ten minutes at the courthouse counter, silently determines whether the court can award you custody of your children, whether it can put the respondent out of the house, whether the respondent loses their firearms, and whether a violation carries a mandatory jail sentence.

Petitioners routinely file the wrong one. Filing an HRO against an ex-spouse because “harassment” is the word that describes the conduct forfeits every family-law remedy in the Domestic Abuse Act. Filing an OFP against a neighbor fails at the threshold no matter how bad the neighbor’s conduct was, because the neighbor is not a family or household member.

This piece is about making that choice deliberately. If you want the mechanics of the HRO process itself, our guide to Minnesota harassment restraining orders covers the filing and hearing steps in detail.

What actually decides which petition you file?

The relationship. The Domestic Abuse Act protects a closed list of people. The harassment statute protects everyone.

Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b), defines “family or household members” as:

(1) spouses and former spouses; (2) parents and children; (3) persons related by blood; (4) persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past; (5) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time; (6) a man and woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is alleged to be the father, regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time; and (7) persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.

Clause (7) is the one that does the most work and generates the most litigation. The statute tells the court how to decide it: “the court shall consider the length of time of the relationship; type of relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and, if the relationship has terminated, length of time since the termination.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b). A three-week situationship is a genuine fight. A two-year relationship is not.

The harassment statute has no relationship requirement at all — and says so expressly. “Harassment” under § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1), reaches conduct with a substantial adverse effect on another’s safety, security, or privacy “regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target.” A landlord, a coworker, a stranger online, a neighbor, and an ex-spouse are all equally eligible respondents.

That asymmetry produces the practical rule: the HRO is always available; the OFP is available only if the relationship qualifies. Which means the real question is never “can I get an HRO,” but “am I giving up an OFP by filing one.”

Does the same conduct support both orders?

Frequently not — and this is where petitioners get surprised. The two statutes describe different categories of behavior, and they overlap far less than the plain-English words suggest.

“Domestic abuse” under § 518B.01, subd. 2(a), is:

(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic threats, within the meaning of section 609.713, subdivision 1; criminal sexual conduct, within the meaning of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3451; sexual extortion within the meaning of section 609.3458; or interference with an emergency call within the meaning of section 609.78, subdivision 2.

Read clause (2) closely. It is not fear generally. It is fear of imminent physical harm. Persistent, degrading, frightening conduct that never carries a threat of imminent violence — hundreds of texts, showing up at a workplace, spreading humiliating material — does not fit any of the three clauses. It is not domestic abuse under the Act, no matter how abusive it is in the ordinary sense of the word.

“Harassment” under § 609.748, subd. 1(a), by contrast, includes:

a single incident of physical or sexual assault, a single incident of harassment under section 609.749, subdivision 2, paragraph (c), clause (8), a single incident of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images under section 617.261, or repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another

Plus targeted residential picketing, and a pattern of attending public events after being notified the actor’s presence is harassing. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(2)–(3).

So the pattern-of-conduct theory lives in the harassment statute, not the Domestic Abuse Act. A family or household member whose complaint is a course of intrusive conduct rather than violence or fear of imminent violence may well have a stronger HRO than OFP — and the right move in some of those cases is to file both, in the same courthouse, on the same facts, and let the court sort the remedies.

The Court of Appeals has described what the harassment standard requires on both sides of the interaction. In Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), the court rejected an overbreadth challenge to § 609.748 and explained that the statute “requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct.” Id. at 567. A petitioner’s genuine subjective distress is not enough; the conduct has to be objectively unreasonable and the reaction objectively reasonable. (Dunham construed an earlier version of subd. 1(a)(1); the Legislature has since added the single-incident categories quoted above.)

What can each order actually order?

This is the difference that matters most and gets discussed least. The two statutes are not two flavors of the same remedy. One is a family-court toolkit; the other is a two-item menu.

An OFP can, under § 518B.01, subd. 6(a), restrain acts of domestic abuse; exclude the abusing party from the shared dwelling and from a described area around it; award temporary custody and establish temporary parenting time on a basis giving primary consideration to the safety of the victim and children; establish temporary child or spousal support; order counseling or a domestic abuse program; award temporary use and possession of property and restrain transfers; exclude the abusing party from the petitioner’s workplace; order no contact by any means; order restitution; continue insurance coverage without change in beneficiary designation; order other relief the court deems necessary; and direct the care, possession, or control of a pet or companion animal.

An HRO can do exactly two things. Section 609.748, subd. 5(a), authorizes an order that:

(1) orders the respondent to cease or avoid the harassment of another person; or (2) orders the respondent to have no contact with another person.

That is the entire universe of HRO relief. No custody. No parenting time. No support. No exclusion from a shared home. No property award. No restitution. If those things are what you need, an HRO cannot give them to you regardless of how compelling your evidence is.

That last row is not trivial. OFP filing fees “are waived for the petitioner and respondent” without condition. § 518B.01, subd. 3a. HRO fees are waived only “if the petition alleges acts that would constitute a violation of section 609.749, subdivision 2, 3, 4, or 5, or sections 609.342 to 609.3451.” § 609.748, subd. 3a. An HRO petition alleging garden-variety repeated intrusive conduct is not fee-waived by statute, though a petitioner may still proceed in forma pauperis under § 563.01 — a right the court is required to advise the petitioner of. § 609.748, subd. 3(a).

Which order takes away the respondent’s guns?

The OFP can. The HRO, as a matter of Minnesota law, does not — the harassment statute does not contain the word “firearm.”

An OFP triggers the state prohibition under § 518B.01, subd. 6(g), only if the order satisfies two conditions:

An order granting relief shall prohibit the abusing party from possessing firearms for the length the order is in effect if the order (1) restrains the abusing party from harassing, stalking, or threatening the petitioner or restrains the abusing party from engaging in other conduct that would place the petitioner in reasonable fear of bodily injury, and (2) includes a finding that the abusing party represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner or prohibits the abusing party from using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against the petitioner.

The findings are not automatic. An OFP that restrains contact but contains no credible-threat finding and no physical-force prohibition does not, by its own terms, carry the firearms prohibition. Counsel on both sides should read the signed order to see which boxes were actually checked.

There is a second layer where the court finds an imminent risk. Under subd. 6(h) (renumbered from 6(i) in 2026, discussed below), when the court issues an order containing the firearms restriction it “shall determine by a preponderance of evidence if an abusing party poses an imminent risk of causing another person substantial bodily harm,” and on such a finding “shall order that the local law enforcement agency take immediate possession of all firearms in the abusing party’s possession.”

Does an ex parte order disqualify someone under federal law?

No. This is the single most misunderstood point in this area, and it turns on a clause most people never read.

The federal prohibition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), applies to a person “who is subject to a court order that—”

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury

Subparagraph (A) is a hearing requirement. An ex parte OFP issued under § 518B.01, subd. 7 — by definition entered without notice to the respondent — cannot satisfy it. The federal disability attaches, if at all, only after a contested or defaulted hearing on notice.

Subparagraph (B) imports a second limit that does not track Minnesota’s definitions. “Intimate partner” is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) as “the spouse of the person, a former spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of the person, and an individual who cohabitates or has cohabited with the person.” Compare that to Minnesota’s seven-clause “family or household member” list. A dating partner who never lived with the respondent is a family or household member under § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(7), but is not an intimate partner under § 921(a)(32). Congress added “dating relationship” language to a different provision — the misdemeanor-conviction prohibition at § 922(g)(9), through the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” at § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) — and did not add it to the intimate-partner definition that feeds § 922(g)(8).

The practical consequence: a Minnesota OFP protecting a non-cohabiting dating partner, entered after a full hearing, with a credible-threat finding, still carries the state firearms prohibition under § 518B.01, subd. 6(g) — but not the federal one.

Did the Supreme Court settle whether § 922(g)(8) is constitutional?

Partly. In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (No. 22-915, decided June 21, 2024), the Court upheld the statute against a facial Second Amendment challenge. The holding, as stated in the syllabus: “When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Id. at 680.

But the Court was deliberate about how far it went. Chief Justice Roberts wrote:

Our analysis starts and stops with Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) because the Government offers ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. We need not decide whether regulation under Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is also permissible.

Id. at 693. Because Rahimi brought a facial challenge — “the ‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’” requiring proof that “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) — the Government needed only to show the statute was constitutional in some applications. Id.

That leaves an unresolved question with real consequences for how a Minnesota OFP should be drafted. An order resting only on § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) — the explicit physical-force prohibition, with no credible-threat finding — rests on the subsection the Supreme Court expressly declined to pass on. Petitioners’ counsel who want the firearms consequence to be durable should be asking the court for the credible-threat finding, not settling for the physical-force language alone.

What changed in 2026?

Two 2026 acts materially revised this area, and both are now in force. Neither carried its own effective-date clause, so the default in Minn. Stat. § 645.02 governs: each act “takes effect on August 1 next following its final enactment, unless a different date is specified in the act.” Laws 2026, ch. 75 was signed by the governor on May 7, 2026, and Laws 2026, ch. 97 on May 18, 2026. Both therefore took effect August 1, 2026.

Note a trap for anyone doing their own research: the Revisor’s website currently displays the 2025 statutory edition with a currency banner. The on-screen text of § 518B.01, subds. 4, 6, and 14, and of § 609.748, is pre-amendment. The operative law is in the session laws.

A uniform firearms transfer procedure — new Minn. Stat. § 518B.03. Laws 2026, ch. 75, § 6, created a single transfer regime governing firearm surrenders ordered under §§ 260C.201, 518B.01, 609.2242, 609.749, and 629.715. Chapter 75, § 4 struck the old transfer machinery out of § 518B.01, subd. 6(g), and replaced it with a cross-reference: the court “shall order the abusing party to transfer any firearms that the person possesses as provided for in section 518B.03 and direct the person to surrender all permits to carry and purchase firearms to the court.” Under the new § 518B.03, subd. 2, transfers must be made “as soon as reasonably practicable” on a deadline the court sets taking into account the subject’s custody status and the location of the firearms — replacing the old flat three-business-day rule. Two provisions are worth flagging: if the subject elects to transfer to the local law enforcement agency, “the agency must accept the transfer,” and a transfer to a third party “must be completed at the local law enforcement agency and either supervised by a peace officer employed by the agency or conducted in a safe zone provided by the agency that is under video surveillance,” on at least 24 hours’ notice.

The petition must now describe the respondent’s firearms. Chapter 75, § 3, added a new paragraph (e) to § 518B.01, subd. 4, requiring that a petition “describe, to the best of the petitioner’s knowledge, the types and locations of any firearms believed by the petitioner to be possessed by the respondent,” while providing that “[a] court may not dismiss a petition if the petitioner does not provide a description of firearms or the locations of firearms owned by the respondent.” The old paragraphs (e) through (k) were relettered (f) through (l) — so citations to § 518B.01, subd. 4, in older briefs and forms are now off by one letter.

Shared wireless plans — new Minn. Stat. § 518B.04. Laws 2026, ch. 97, art. 7, § 2, added clause (16) to § 518B.01, subd. 6(a): the court may, “if requested by the petitioner, issue a separate order under section 518B.04.” The new section, added by ch. 97, art. 7, § 3, applies where the respondent and the petitioner or protected party share a wireless plan and the respondent is the account holder. The court may order the carrier, “without charge, penalty, or fee,” to transfer billing authority and all rights to the wireless number to the petitioner, or to remove or release the petitioner from the plan and assign a substitute number. The carrier “must abide by the terms of the order by the end of the following billing cycle” and must treat the order as confidential. This is a meaningful practical remedy: a respondent who controls the account controls location data, call records, and the ability to shut off the phone. It has no counterpart in the HRO statute.

HRO petitioners can now be told when service happens. Laws 2026, ch. 97, art. 6, § 4, added § 609.748, subd. 5d: on a petitioner’s request, a sheriff, law enforcement officer, or designee “must make reasonable efforts to notify the petitioner before or immediately after service that the respondent will be or has been served with the order,” including “texting, calling, or emailing the petitioner.” The moment of service is a recognized flashpoint. Ask for this in writing when you file.

How fast does each one move?

Both statutes contemplate immediate relief without notice, but the triggers differ.

For an OFP, the court may issue an ex parte order “[w]here an application under this section alleges an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse.” § 518B.01, subd. 7(a). If no ex parte order issues, the hearing “shall be held not later than 14 days from the date of the order for hearing.” Subd. 5(a). If an ex parte order has issued and the petitioner seeks relief beyond the limited ex parte menu in subd. 7(a), “a hearing must be held within seven days,” and personal service may be made up to 12 hours before the hearing — though a respondent served fewer than five days out may request a continuance of up to five days, “which continuance shall be granted unless there are compelling reasons not to.” Subd. 5(c). If the ex parte order granted only subd. 7(a) relief and the respondent requests a hearing, the hearing is held “within ten days of the court’s receipt of the respondent’s request.” Subd. 5(d).

For an HRO, the court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice “if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” § 609.748, subd. 4(b). But note the added burden for the most common theory: “When a petition alleges harassment as defined by subdivision 1, paragraph (a), clause (1), the petition must further allege an immediate and present danger of harassment before the court may issue a temporary restraining order.” Id. Requests for a hearing — by either party — “must be made within 20 days” of service of the petition or of completed service. Subds. 3(d), 4(f).

What happens when the order is violated?

Both statutes make violation a misdemeanor, a gross misdemeanor if committed within ten years of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction or delinquency adjudication, and a felony punishable by up to five years or a $10,000 fine on the enumerated aggravators. §§ 518B.01, subd. 14(b)–(d); 609.748, subd. 6(b)–(d).

The enforcement machinery is not equivalent, though.

The OFP carries mandatory minimum sentences. On a misdemeanor conviction “the defendant must be sentenced to a minimum of three days imprisonment and must be ordered to participate in counseling or other appropriate programs selected by the court”; on a gross misdemeanor conviction, “a minimum of ten days imprisonment,” and “[n]otwithstanding section 609.135, the court must impose and execute the minimum sentence.” § 518B.01, subd. 14(b)–(c). On a felony conviction with a stayed sentence, the court “shall impose at least a 30-day period of incarceration as a condition of probation.” Subd. 14(d). Section 609.748 contains no comparable mandatory minimums.

The OFP also carries a custody hold. A person arrested for violating an OFP “shall be held in custody for at least 36 hours, excluding the day of arrest, Sundays, and holidays, unless the person is released earlier by a judge or judicial officer.” § 518B.01, subd. 14(e). The HRO statute requires warrantless arrest on probable cause, § 609.748, subd. 6(g), but has no hold provision.

Finally, an OFP violation conviction carries its own firearms consequence — and it just got broader. Under § 518B.01, subd. 14(k)–(l), a person convicted of violating an OFP “is prohibited from possessing firearms for three years from the date of conviction,” and possession in violation of that prohibition is a gross misdemeanor; where the court determines a firearm was used during the violation, subd. 14(j) allows a prohibition “for any period longer than three years or for the remainder of the person’s life.” Laws 2026, ch. 75, § 5 replaced “a pistol” with “firearms” in paragraphs (k) and (l), effective August 1, 2026 — the current, in-force prohibition covers all firearms, not just pistols. Section 609.748 has no analogue.

Can you have both?

Yes. Section 518B.01, subd. 16, provides that “[a]ny proceeding under this section shall be in addition to other civil or criminal remedies.” Nothing in either statute makes them mutually exclusive, and there are real cases where both belong on file — for example, where the qualifying relationship is contested under subd. 2(b)(7) and an HRO provides a fallback that does not depend on winning that fight.

Two related points on interaction with family court. First, a finding of domestic abuse follows the parties: “In a subsequent custody proceeding the court must consider a finding in a proceeding under this chapter or under a similar law of another state that domestic abuse has occurred between the parties.” § 518B.01, subd. 17. Second, the no-abuse provision is insulated from the dissolution case — an order granting relief under subd. 6(a)(1) “may not be vacated or modified in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation,” though the court may hear a modification motion concurrently with the dissolution on proper notice, with a separate modification order to issue. Subd. 6(c). For how protective orders interact with a parenting-time schedule, see our overview of Minnesota parenting time and support.

One more overlap worth knowing: where the underlying conduct involves recording or monitoring, the evidence questions are governed by a separate body of law. Our article on Minnesota’s surveillance and recording consent rules addresses what a party may lawfully record and what a court will receive.

Practical takeaways

• Diagnose the relationship before the conduct. If the respondent is a family or household member under § 518B.01, subd. 2(b), the OFP is on the table and you should have a reason for not using it.
• Match the conduct to the right definition. Repeated intrusive conduct without imminent-harm fear is harassment, not domestic abuse. That is an HRO case even between former spouses.
• Ask for the firearms finding by name. The § 518B.01, subd. 6(g), prohibition depends on findings the court has to actually make, and after Rahimi the credible-threat finding is the durable one.
• Do not assume an ex parte order disarms anyone federally. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) requires a hearing on actual notice.
• Check whether the protected person is an “intimate partner.” A non-cohabiting dating partner is covered by Minnesota law and not by § 921(a)(32).
• Update your forms and cites for the 2026 changes. Section 518B.01, subd. 4, is relettered; the transfer procedure now lives in § 518B.03; wireless-plan relief is new in § 518B.04; and HRO petitioners can request notice of service under § 609.748, subd. 5d.

Madgett Law, LLC represents petitioners and respondents in Order for Protection and Harassment Restraining Order proceedings in Minnesota district courts, including contested evidentiary hearings, motions to modify or vacate, extensions and long-term orders, and the family-law consequences that follow an OFP — custody, parenting time, exclusion from a shared home, and firearms restrictions. We also defend against petitions brought for leverage in a dissolution or custody dispute. If you have been served with a petition or need to file one, call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) (definition of “domestic abuse”), subd. 2(b) (definition of “family or household members” and factors for significant romantic or sexual relationship), subd. 3a (filing fees waived), subd. 4 (petition requirements), subd. 5(a), (c), (d) (hearing timing), subd. 6(a) (relief available), subd. 6(b) (duration), subd. 6(c) (no vacatur in dissolution), subd. 6(g) (firearms prohibition findings), subd. 6(h) (imminent-risk immediate possession), subd. 6a(c) (relief up to 50 years), subd. 7(a) (ex parte standard), subd. 14(b)–(e) (violation penalties, mandatory minimums, 36-hour hold), subd. 14(j)–(l) (pistol prohibition on conviction), subd. 16 (remedies cumulative), subd. 17 (effect on custody proceedings), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/518B.01. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a) (definition of “harassment”), subd. 3(a), (d) (petition, advisory on in forma pauperis, 20-day hearing request), subd. 3a (conditional fee waiver), subd. 4(b), (f) (temporary restraining order standard and added immediate-and-present-danger allegation), subd. 5(a) (relief available), subd. 5(b) (duration and 50-year orders), subd. 6(b)–(d), (g) (violation penalties and warrantless arrest), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.748. Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (acts take effect August 1 next following final enactment absent a specified date), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/645.02. Laws 2026, ch. 75, §§ 3 (new § 518B.01, subd. 4(e), firearms description in petition, and relettering), 4 (amending § 518B.01, subd. 6(g)–(h), to cross-reference § 518B.03), 5 (amending § 518B.01, subd. 14(k)–(l), replacing “a pistol” with “firearms”), 6 (creating § 518B.03, subds. 1–3, uniform transfer order procedure); signed by the governor May 7, 2026, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/2026/0/Session+Law/Chapter/75/. Laws 2026, ch. 97, art. 6, § 4 (adding § 609.748, subd. 5d, notice to petitioner of service), art. 7, § 2 (adding § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(16)), art. 7, § 3 (creating § 518B.04, shared wireless plans); signed by the governor May 18, 2026, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/2026/0/Session+Law/Chapter/97/. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A)–(C) (federal firearms prohibition; hearing, restraint, and finding requirements), https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section922&num=0&edition=prelim. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) (definition of “intimate partner”), § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (dating-relationship language in “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”), https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section921&num=0&edition=prelim. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (No. 22–915, decided June 21, 2024) (syllabus holding at 680; “starts and stops with Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i)” and Salerno facial-challenge standard at 693), official preliminary print, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/602us1r43_p860.pdf. Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (No. A05-421) (§ 609.748 requires objectively unreasonable conduct or intent and an objectively reasonable belief), https://static.case.law/nw2d/708/cases/0552-01.json.

This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and it does not promise or imply any particular outcome. Statutes and case law change; verify current authority before acting. If you have a specific situation, consult a lawyer.