Two events in Minnesota rewrite an estate plan without anyone signing anything: a divorce and a homicide. The first is far more common, has been to the United States Supreme Court, and was quietly expanded in 2025 in a way most Minnesotans have not heard about.
Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, subd. 1, now provides:
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, other than a trust instrument under section 501C.1207, executed prior to the dissolution or annulment of an individual’s marriage, a court order, a contract relating to the division of the marital property made between individuals before or after their marriage, dissolution, or annulment, or a plan document governing a qualified or nonqualified retirement plan, the dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable:
(1) disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of property made in a governing instrument by an individual to the individual’s former spouse or any members of the former spouse’s family who are not also members of the individual’s family;
(2) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on an individual’s former spouse; and
(3) nomination in a governing instrument, nominating an individual’s former spouse or any members of the former spouse’s family who are not also members of the individual’s family to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian.
The bolded language in clauses (1) and (3) is new. It was added by 2025 Minn. Laws ch. 15, § 30, which was presented to and signed by the governor on May 6, 2025. Section 30 carries no separate effective-date clause, so under Minn. Stat. § 645.02 it took effect August 1, 2025.
What actually changed in 2025
Before the amendment, a divorce revoked designations to the ex-spouse. It did nothing about the ex-spouse’s mother, or the stepchildren, or the brother-in-law who was named as successor trustee.
Now it revokes those too — but only where they are “members of the former spouse’s family who are not also members of the individual’s family.” A child of the marriage belongs to both families and is untouched. A child the former spouse brought into the marriage, whom the individual never adopted, belongs only to the former spouse’s family and is revoked.
Where the line actually falls is less clear than that example suggests, because the statute does not define “family.” The term appears nowhere in § 524.1-201, the definitions section for the chapter, and Minnesota did not import the Uniform Probate Code’s “relative” language or its definition. Whether a former spouse’s adult sibling, or a stepchild the individual raised but never adopted, is a “member of the individual’s family” is a question the 2025 act leaves open.
The reach of clause (3) is the sleeper. For a dissolution entered on or after the amendment’s effective date, fiduciary nominations of the former spouse’s relatives are revoked by operation of law: personal representative, trustee, conservator, agent under a power of attorney, guardian of the children. Someone who divorces in 2026 and leaves in place a will nominating a former sister-in-law as successor personal representative may find that slot empty.
Whether the amendment reaches a divorce that was already final on August 1, 2025 is an open question, and we are aware of no Minnesota decision answering it. Three things cut against retroactive reach. Minn. Stat. § 645.21 provides that “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Section 524.2-804, subd. 1, operates at a fixed moment — “the dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes” — so where the dissolution predates the amendment, so does the operative event. And § 30 of the 2025 act carries no application clause, though the legislature wrote one into § 29 of the very same chapter (“applies to actions commenced on or after that date”), which is at least some evidence it knew how to reach backward when it meant to. Sveen does not resolve this: it holds that retroactive application of the statute would not violate the Contracts Clause, not that this amendment applies retroactively as a matter of Minnesota law.
Anyone relying on a pre-August 2025 fiduciary nomination of a former in-law should treat the question as unsettled and re-execute rather than litigate it.
Which instruments does this reach?
Everything, essentially. “Governing instrument” is defined at Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(27) as
a deed; will; trust; insurance or annuity policy; account with POD designation; security registered in beneficiary form (TOD); transfer on death (TOD) deed; pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan; instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney; or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type.
So life insurance, POD and TOD accounts, a transfer on death deed, a power of attorney, and a will are all inside the statute.
Trusts have their own parallel section. Section 524.2-804, subd. 1, expressly excepts “a trust instrument under section 501C.1207,” and § 501C.1207, subd. 1, supplies the rule for a trust “in which a sole settlor reserves a power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate”: dissolution or annulment “revokes any disposition, provision for beneficial enjoyment or appointment of property made by the trust instrument to a settlor’s former spouse, any provisions conferring a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse and any appointment of the former spouse as trustee, unless the trust instrument expressly provides otherwise.” Note that § 501C.1207 was not amended in 2025 and does not reach the former spouse’s family — it revokes only provisions in favor of the former spouse and the former spouse’s appointment as trustee. That leaves a boundary worth being careful about: a trustee nominated in a will sits in a governing instrument under § 524.2-804 and is exposed to the broadened clause (3); a trustee named in a revocable trust instrument is governed by § 501C.1207 and is not. The two provisions can therefore produce different answers for the same person depending on which document names them.
The four things that override the statute
Subdivision 1’s opening clause is a list of overrides, and each is worth knowing:
- The express terms of the governing instrument itself, if executed before the dissolution. A designation that says, in terms, that it survives a divorce, survives.
- A court order. A dissolution decree may direct that a designation remain in place — for example, securing a support obligation — and it controls.
- A marital property contract, made before or after the marriage, dissolution, or annulment.
- A plan document governing a qualified or nonqualified retirement plan.
That fourth one is the item most likely to produce a surprise. The carve-out is phrased as “[e]xcept as provided by … a plan document governing a qualified or nonqualified retirement plan” — so the statute yields to what the plan document actually provides, rather than standing aside from retirement plans categorically. Where the plan document speaks to the question, a 401(k) or pension beneficiary designation naming a former spouse may well still be a designation naming the former spouse. Retirement plans require an affirmative change of designation with the plan administrator; the state statute will not do it for you.
What happens to the revoked interest?
Subdivision 2 is one sentence: “Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse died immediately before the dissolution or annulment.”
So the property passes to the contingent beneficiary, or under the alternate disposition in the instrument, or — if there is none — into the estate. The parallel trust provision, § 501C.1207, subd. 2, sets the constructive death at “the date of the entry of the judgment and decree dissolving or annulling the settlor’s marriage.”
Subdivision 3 provides for revival: “Provisions revoked solely by this section are revived by the individual’s remarriage to the former spouse or by a nullification of the dissolution or annulment.”
And subdivision 4 forecloses the argument that some other life change should have the same effect: “No change of circumstances other than as described in this section and in section 524.2-803 effects a revocation.” Not a separation, not an estrangement, not a new marriage to someone else. Section 501C.1207, subd. 3, adds the point directly for trusts: “A decree of separation which does not terminate the status of spouses is not a dissolution of marriage for purposes of this section.”
What the insurance company owes you, and when
Subdivision 5 protects payors, with a hinge that decides who wins after a wrongful payment:
(a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a dissolution, annulment, or remarriage, or for having taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, before the payor or other third party received written notice of the dissolution, annulment, or remarriage. A payor or other third party is liable for a payment made or other action taken after the payor or other third party received written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section.
Paragraph (b) specifies delivery “to the payor’s or other third party’s main office or home,” and gives the payor an interpleader-style option: it may pay the amount or transfer the property “to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents’ estates located in the county of the decedent’s residence,” and under which “[p]ayments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.”
The practical rule for a contingent beneficiary who believes a revoked designation is about to be honored: send written notice to the insurer’s main office, immediately, and keep proof of delivery. Before that notice, the money is gone and your claim is against the recipient. After it, the insurer pays at its peril.
The Supreme Court case is a Minnesota case
Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811 (2018), is the leading American authority on revocation-on-divorce statutes, and it is about Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804.
Mark Sveen bought a life insurance policy in 1998, naming his wife Kaye Melin as primary beneficiary and his two children from a prior marriage as contingent beneficiaries. Minnesota enacted § 524.2-804 in 2002. The Sveen–Melin marriage ended in 2007; the divorce decree said nothing about the policy, and Sveen never changed the designation. He died in 2011. Id. at 817. Melin argued that applying the later-enacted statute to her pre-existing designation violated the Contracts Clause. The Eighth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court, holding “a revocation-upon-divorce statute like [Minnesota’s] violates the Contract Clause when applied retroactively.” Id. at 818 (quoting Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Melin, 853 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 2017)).
The Supreme Court reversed, 8–1, in an opinion by Justice Kagan that opens with the epigram “[d]eath is not the end; there remains the litigation over the estate.” Sveen, 584 U.S. at 814. The Court resolved the case at the first step of the two-step Contracts Clause test — whether the law “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship” — and held it did not, for three reasons stated together:
First, the statute is designed to reflect a policyholder’s intent—and so to support, rather than impair, the contractual scheme. Second, the law is unlikely to disturb any policyholder’s expectations because it does no more than a divorce court could always have done. And third, the statute supplies a mere default rule, which the policyholder can undo in a moment.
Id. at 819–820.
The reasoning behind the first point is the best short statement of what these statutes are for. Legislatures presume “that the average Joe does not want his ex inheriting what he leaves behind,” and a decedent’s failure to change a beneficiary “probably resulted from ‘inattention,’ not ‘intention.’” Id. at 815. The Court noted that 26 States had by then adopted revocation-on-divorce laws substantially similar to the Uniform Probate Code’s, and “Minnesota is one.” Id.
Two consequences for Minnesota practice follow from Sveen. The statute was applied to a designation made before its 2002 enactment, and the Court held that doing so does not violate the Contracts Clause — a constitutional holding, not a construction of the statute’s temporal reach. And the Court’s second rationale is a useful reminder of what a dissolution decree can do: in Minnesota, as elsewhere, “divorce courts have always had ‘broad discretion in dividing property upon dissolution of a marriage,’” including the power to revoke a spousal beneficiary designation or to mandate that an old one remain. Id. at 816. If a designation is meant to survive, the place to say so is the decree.
The other automatic rewrite: the slayer statute
Section 524.2-803 disqualifies a killer, and it is broader than most people assume.
Paragraph (a) covers “[a] surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent,” who “is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this article, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse’s or child’s share, homestead, exempt property, and a family allowance,” with the estate passing “as if the killer had predeceased the decedent.” That list closes off every one of the family entitlements discussed in what comes off the top of a Minnesota estate.
Paragraph (b) severs joint tenancies — real and personal property, joint bank, savings association, and credit union accounts, “and any other form of co-ownership with survivorship incidents.” Paragraph (c) reaches bonds and other contractual arrangements. Paragraph (d) handles life insurance, including the situation where the killer holds a beneficial ownership interest in a corporation, partnership, trust, or association that is the named beneficiary — the proceeds are payable by court order “to the extent of the killer’s beneficial ownership.” Paragraph (e) sweeps up the rest: “Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer shall be treated in accordance with the principles of this section.”
No conviction is required. Paragraph (f):
A final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of felonious and intentional killing the court may determine by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was felonious and intentional for purposes of this section.
An acquittal in the criminal case is not the end of the civil question. The probate court applies the civil standard.
Paragraphs (h) and (i), added in 2013, supply an interim freeze that most practitioners do not know exists. Where a complaint or indictment has been issued, the personal representative, special administrator, or an interested person may file a copy with the court together with an inventory of the decedent’s personal property that may be affected — including specifically devised items, § 524.2-403 exempt property, property claimed to have sentimental value to an eligible child under § 525.152, and any other personal property believed in good faith to belong to the decedent. On motion and for good cause, the court may reserve the distribution determination, hold property in trust or escrow, prohibit sale or removal, or permit sale, disposition, removal, or transfer of property jointly held by the decedent and the disqualified person “only to the extent necessary for reasonable and ordinary living expenses by the disqualified individual, subject to approval and on the terms the court deems just and proper.” An ex parte order is available on a showing of irreparable harm, with notice within 48 hours and a hearing within five days.
Third parties are protected here too, on the same notice logic: under paragraph (g), an insurance company, bank, or other obligor “is not liable by reason of this section unless prior to payment it has received at its home office or principal address written notice of a claim under this section,” and paragraph (d) requires an insurer that has received such notice at its home office to withhold payment to all beneficiaries pending a court order.
What to do
- After any divorce, request current beneficiary confirmations from every plan and carrier, in writing. The statute changes the designation; it does not update the carrier’s file, and the carrier pays what the file says until it gets written notice.
- Do not rely on § 524.2-804 for a retirement plan. The plan-document carve-out is in the statute’s first sentence. Change those designations yourself.
- If you want an ex-spouse or the ex-spouse’s relative to keep an interest, say so — in the decree, in a marital property contract, or in the express terms of the instrument. Silence now revokes more than it did before August 1, 2025.
- Pull every fiduciary nomination in your will, trust, power of attorney, and health care directive. The 2025 amendment may have vacated a nomination you are still relying on.
- Update the trust separately. Section 501C.1207 has its own rule and was not amended in 2025.
Madgett Law, LLC
We handle Minnesota estate disputes arising from divorce and from death — establishing or defeating a § 524.2-804 revocation against an insurer or a former spouse, sorting out which instruments the retirement-plan carve-out protects, updating estate plans after a dissolution so nothing depends on a default rule, and litigating disqualification and interim-freeze relief under § 524.2-803. If a death benefit is about to be paid to someone whose designation you believe the law revoked, call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.
Sources: Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804 — subd. 1 (revocation on dissolution or annulment; the four overrides, including a plan document governing a qualified or nonqualified retirement plan and the exclusion of trust instruments under § 501C.1207; clauses (1)–(3), including the former spouse’s family members who are not also members of the individual’s family), subd. 2 (provisions given effect as if the former spouse died immediately before the dissolution or annulment), subd. 3 (revival by remarriage or nullification), subd. 4 (no revocation for any other change of circumstances except as in §§ 524.2-803 and 524.2-804), subd. 5(a)–(b) (payor protection before written notice; liability after; delivery to the main office or home; deposit with the court and discharge). Minn. Stat. § 501C.1207 — subd. 1 (revocation of trust provisions to a former spouse where a sole settlor reserved a power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, unless the trust instrument expressly provides otherwise), subd. 2 (property passes as if the former spouse died on the date of entry of the judgment and decree), subd. 3 (revival by remarriage; a decree of separation that does not terminate the status of spouses is not a dissolution). Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(27) (definition of “governing instrument”). Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (an act takes effect August 1 next following final enactment unless a different date is specified). Minn. Stat. § 524.2-803 — para. (a) (disqualification from benefits under the will and article 2, including intestate share, elective share, omitted spouse’s or child’s share, homestead, exempt property, and family allowance; estate passes as if the killer predeceased), para. (b) (severance of joint tenancies including joint accounts), para. (c) (bonds and other contractual arrangements), para. (d) (life insurance, including beneficial ownership through an entity; insurer’s duty to withhold on written notice at its home office), para. (e) (other acquisitions), para. (f) (a final judgment of conviction is conclusive; absent a conviction the court may determine the question by a preponderance of the evidence), para. (g) (protection of good-faith purchasers and of obligors absent prior written notice at the home office or principal address), para. (h) (filing of the complaint or indictment with an attested inventory of affected personal property, including § 524.2-513 specific devises, § 524.2-403 exempt property, and § 525.152 sentimental-value property), para. (i) (available interim relief; ex parte order on a showing of irreparable harm, notice within 48 hours, hearing within five days). Session law: the “or any members of the former spouse’s family who are not also members of the individual’s family” language in § 524.2-804, subd. 1, clauses (1) and (3), was added by 2025 Minn. Laws ch. 15, § 30, which amended Minnesota Statutes 2024, section 524.2-804, subdivision 1; the enrolled text was reviewed and the section carries no separate effective-date clause. The chapter was presented to and signed by the governor on May 6, 2025. Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811 (2018) (Kagan, J.), read from the official United States Reports bound volume 584 published by the Supreme Court of the United States: at 814 (“[d]eath is not the end; there remains the litigation over the estate,” quoting 8 The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce 365 (1911)); at 815 (“the average Joe does not want his ex inheriting what he leaves behind”; failure to change a beneficiary “probably resulted from ‘inattention,’ not ‘intention’”; 26 States had adopted substantially similar laws and “Minnesota is one”); at 816 (prior Minnesota law; divorce courts’ “broad discretion in dividing property upon dissolution of a marriage,” quoting Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001)); at 817 (definition of “governing instrument” under Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201; court order and marital settlement as overrides; the Sveen–Melin facts); at 818 (Eighth Circuit holding, quoting Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Melin, 853 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 2017)); at 819 (the two-step Contracts Clause test and the threshold “substantial impairment” question, quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)); at 819–820 (the three aspects of Minnesota’s law that defeat the substantial-impairment argument). Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (no law construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature). Statutory text retrieved from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2025 edition) and from the enrolled session law; no pending-amendment banner appeared on any section cited. Bold emphasis within quoted statutory text is added. This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Whether a particular designation was revoked depends on the instrument, the decree, and in the case of a retirement plan on the plan documents. No outcome is promised or implied.