In most of the country, you start a lawsuit by handing the complaint to the clerk. Minnesota does not work that way. Here, a civil action is commenced when the summons is served on the defendant — and for a year after that, the court may have no idea the case exists.
That one design choice is the source of nearly every service disaster in Minnesota practice. Because commencement is service, the statute of limitations runs to the date of service, not the date of filing. Because commencement is service, a plaintiff who mails the papers and gets a signed green card has commenced nothing. And because the Supreme Court bolted a filing deadline onto a service-based system in 2013, a case that was properly commenced and actively litigated can be dismissed with prejudice on day 366 without anyone filing a motion.
This article walks the mechanics — Rules 3, 4, and 5.04(a) — and the places where practitioners and self-represented litigants actually lose.
When is a Minnesota lawsuit commenced?
There are exactly three ways, and they are listed in the rule:
A civil action is commenced against each defendant:
(a) when the summons is served upon that defendant; or
(b) at the date of signing a waiver of service pursuant to Rule 4.05; or
(c) when the summons is delivered for service to the sheriff in the county where the defendant resides personally, by U.S. Mail (postage prepaid), by commercial courier with proof of delivery, or by electronic means consented to by the sheriff’s office either in writing or electronically; but such delivery shall be ineffectual unless within 60 days thereafter the summons is actually served on that defendant or the first publication thereof is made.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01.
Three practical points hide in that text.
First, the sheriff route in 3.01(c) is a limitations-period lifeline, and it is conditional. If the six-year clock on a negligence claim expires Friday and you cannot find the defendant, delivering the summons to the sheriff of the county where the defendant resides commences the action as of the delivery date. But the delivery is “ineffectual” unless service is actually accomplished — or first publication is made — within 60 days. Miss the 60 days and the commencement date evaporates retroactively. Note also what the rule requires: the sheriff in the county where the defendant resides, not the county where you filed or the county where you practice.
Second, 3.01(c) was modernized in 2020. Delivery may be by hand, U.S. Mail, commercial courier with proof of delivery, or electronic means the sheriff’s office has consented to. The advisory committee was explicit that fax is deliberately excluded, and equally explicit that this provision governs only how you get the papers to the sheriff — it “does not restrict or change how service on the defendant is accomplished.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01 advisory comm. cmt. — 2020 amendments.
Third, 3.01(b) no longer says what a lot of older material says it says. Until July 1, 2018, Rule 4.05 was captioned “Service by Mail” and worked through a Form 22 acknowledgment. It was replaced wholesale by a federal-style waiver procedure. The committee’s own description of why is worth reading, because it explains the trap that still catches people:
The former procedure created the illusion that valid service could be accomplished by U.S. Mail, but it was a procedure that gave control over the process completely to the defendant and little incentive to a plaintiff to make use of it. This rule does not authorize service by mere mailing — it is necessary for the defendant to waive formal service and return the waiver-of-service form. Service is accomplished and proven by the waiver, not the mailing.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 advisory comm. cmt. — 2018 amendments.
Under current Rule 4.05, the plaintiff sends the complaint plus two copies of Form 22B and a prepaid return means; the defendant gets 30 days to return it (60 days if outside the United States); a defendant who refuses without good cause must be ordered to pay the later service expenses and the fees of the motion to collect them; and a defendant who signs gets 60 days from the date the request was sent to answer (90 days if abroad). Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(a)–(c). Signing a waiver does not waive personal jurisdiction or venue objections. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(e).
Can I serve a summons by certified mail in Minnesota?
No — and the Minnesota Supreme Court said so in a case where the answer cost the plaintiff his entire claim.
In Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2016), the plaintiff tried repeatedly to serve a car-crash defendant through the sheriff and a private process server, failed, and finally sent the summons and complaint by certified mail two months before the six-year limitations period expired. The defendant personally signed the return receipt. The plaintiff argued that the mail carrier had accomplished “personal service” under Rule 4.03 and that the signed green card was the “written admission or acknowledgment of the party served” that proves service under Rule 4.06.
The court rejected both arguments and reinstated dismissal with prejudice:
To state the obvious: service by mail is not personal service, and personal service is not service by mail.
Melillo, 880 N.W.2d at 864. It also held that a mail carrier cannot effect personal service because Minnesota requires that “the process server know that a summons is being served and intend to serve it,” and nothing showed the carrier “had any idea what was in the envelope.” Id. at 864–65. And the return receipt proves nothing about a summons: “When Heitland signed for an envelope, he did not admit or acknowledge that he had received a summons and complaint. He acknowledged that he had received an envelope.” Id. at 865.
Melillo was decided under the pre-2018 version of Rule 4.05, which at least had a mail procedure. Now there is none. The holding is stronger today than it was in 2016, not weaker.
The governing principle is older and blunter: “Service of process in a manner not authorized by the rule is ineffective service.” Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997), quoted in Melillo, 880 N.W.2d at 864.
The one thing that does work by agreement. Minnesota permits parties to contract around Rule 4 entirely. “An agreement to forego formal service and be served in ways not provided for by rule is allowed in Minnesota. Indeed, a defendant may waive service altogether.” DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Minn. 2016). DeCook upheld service by email on individual defendants through their employer’s compliance officer, because the record showed the defendants had actually authorized it. But note what did the work there: actual authority, documented. The court was careful that apparent authority alone will not bind a defendant for service purposes. If defense counsel agrees to accept service, get it in writing that identifies the specific clients, and keep it.
What counts as a defendant’s “usual place of abode”?
Rule 4.03(a) permits substituted service “by leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.” Both italicized conditions are litigated constantly, and the phrase is far narrower than “residence.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court defined it in 1909 and has not moved:
As used in this sense, “abode” means one’s fixed place of residence for the time being. In such connection “abode” and “residence” may be synonymous. But ordinarily “usual place of abode” is a much more restricted term than “residence,” and means the place where the defendant is actually living at the time when service is made. . . . Therefore “usual place of abode” means “present place of abode.”
Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459–60, 119 N.W. 404, 404–05 (1909).
Three consequences follow.
Actual notice does not cure a bad address. Berryhill held that a defendant’s daughter telling him about the summons was irrelevant: “Proof, however, of knowledge of an attempt at personal service or at substituted personal service is not proof of service. The service must accord strictly with statutory requirements.” 106 Minn. at 459, 119 N.W. at 404. The Court of Appeals put the modern version of it this way: “Actual notice will not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction absent substantial compliance with Rule 4.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1988), quoted in Lundgren v. Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
The married-defendant presumption is rebuttable, and separation rebuts it. Berryhill recognized that for a married person the usual abode is “prima facie the house wherein his wife and family reside” — then held the presumption rebutted where the spouses had lived apart for months and the defendant had never set foot on the premises. 106 Minn. at 460, 119 N.W. at 405. Lundgren v. Green applied the same analysis to a physician served at his estranged wife’s home: he had separated, bought a new house, moved his personal property, and had no intent to return, so the old address was not his abode and the service failed — after the statute of limitations had run. 592 N.W.2d at 892–93.
Temporary absence is different from departure. A person who leaves intending to come back keeps the abode; intent not to return is what breaks it. Lundgren, 592 N.W.2d at 891 (discussing Holtberg v. Bommersbach, 236 Minn. 335, 52 N.W.2d 766 (1952)). Berryhill also noted the flip side: a defendant confined in jail is at his usual place of abode there, “although his residence was compulsory.” 106 Minn. at 460, 119 N.W. at 405.
Practical translation: the last known address on a police report or a credit application is a lead, not a service address. Where a defendant’s living situation is unstable — a separation, an eviction, a hospitalization, a move — confirm current occupancy before the process server goes out, and confirm that the person accepting the papers actually resides there. A roommate’s visiting boyfriend is not a person “then residing therein.”
How do you serve a Minnesota LLC? Rule 4.03 never mentions one.
Read Rule 4.03 straight through and you will find provisions for individuals, partnerships and associations, corporations, the State, and public corporations. There is no subdivision for limited liability companies — by far the most common Minnesota business form.
The answer is not in the rule. It is in the escape hatch each subdivision contains: service may also be made on an agent “designated by statute,” and where a statute designates a recipient, “any statutory provision for the manner of such service shall be complied with.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(b), (c).
The statute is Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 1, which covers entities governed by chapter 322C (Minnesota’s LLC act), along with chapters 302A, 303, 317A, 321, 323A and others. It sets a strict hierarchy:
A process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served upon an entity governed by chapter 221, 302A, 303, 317A, 321, 322C, 323A, 330, 540, or 543 may be served on: (1) the registered agent, if any; (2) if no agent has been appointed then on an officer, manager, or general partner of the entity; or (3) if no agent, officer, manager, or general partner can be found at the address on file with the secretary of state, the secretary of state as provided in this section.
Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 1.
Tier three is a fallback, not an option. You reach the Secretary of State only after the agent, officer, manager, or general partner “can[not] be found at the address on file.” That is a diligence requirement with a documentary record behind it: a return of no service at the registered address is what unlocks it. Service on the Secretary of State under subdivision 3 is made by filing one copy of the process with a $35 fee, and the Secretary then forwards a copy by certified mail to the registered office. § 5.25, subds. 3, 6. Subdivision 5 addresses dissolved, withdrawn, and revoked entities and provides that “[t]he court shall determine if service is proper” — which is a warning that serving a defunct LLC is a contested question, not a checkbox.
When can you serve by publication — and which ground should you pick?
Rule 4.04(a) lists five circumstances in which “[s]ervice by publication shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction”:
- The defendant is a resident individual domiciliary who departed the state with intent to defraud creditors or avoid service, or remains concealed within the state with that intent;
- The plaintiff has acquired a lien by attachment or garnishment on property or credits in the state, and the defendant is either a resident who has left or cannot be found, or a nonresident individual or foreign entity;
- The action is for marriage dissolution or separate maintenance and the court has ordered published notice;
- The subject of the action is real or personal property within the state in or upon which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, or the relief demanded consists wholly or partly in excluding the defendant from such interest or lien;
- The action is to foreclose a mortgage or enforce a lien on real estate within the state.
Most people reach for (a)(1) because it sounds like the “I can’t find the defendant” clause. It is the hardest of the five, and Shamrock Development, Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 2008), is why.
In Shamrock, a judgment creditor’s attorney filed an affidavit tracking (a)(1) word for word, published for three weeks, and won below on the theory that a good-faith affidavit is enough. The Supreme Court reversed:
The essential jurisdictional facts regarding whether a defendant is a resident individual domiciliary must actually exist in order to confer jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the essential and clear requirements for conferring jurisdiction by service of publication under Rule 4.04(a)(1).
754 N.W.2d at 383. The court remanded for findings on whether Smith was in fact a Minnesota resident domiciliary who in fact left with intent to defraud creditors or avoid service. Id. at 384. The framing was strict from the start: because “[s]ervice by publication is in derogation of the common law,” its requirements “must be strictly complied with.” Id. at 382 (quoting Wiik v. Russell, 173 Minn. 580, 583, 218 N.W. 110, 111 (1928)).
That is the case for picking the easy predicate. Grounds (a)(4) and (a)(5) turn on what the action is about — an interest in Minnesota property, a mortgage or lien foreclosure — facts that appear on the face of the complaint and are provable from a recorded instrument. Ground (a)(1) turns on the defendant’s residency, domicile, and subjective intent, all of which the defendant will contest years later on a motion to vacate, and all of which the plaintiff can lose. If the case gives you a real-property or lien hook, use it. You need one enumerated ground, not the most dramatic one.
The mechanics are unforgiving in their own right. Publication requires that the complaint and an affidavit be filed with the court first; the affidavit must state the existence of one of the enumerated cases, state the affiant’s belief that the defendant is not a resident or cannot be found, and state either that the affiant mailed a copy of the summons to the defendant’s residence or that the residence is unknown. Notice runs three weeks, and “[t]he service of the summons shall be deemed complete 21 days after the first publication.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(a). Where title to or an interest in real property is involved, the publication must also contain a description of the property and a statement of the object of the action. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.041.
Where the publication runs is fixed by statute, not by preference. “Published notice,” used “in reference to the giving of notice in any proceeding or the service of any summons, order, or process in judicial proceedings,” means “the publication in full of the notice, or other paper referred to, in the regular issue of a qualified newspaper, once each week for the number of weeks specified.” Minn. Stat. § 645.11. The same section supplies a small mercy: if a newspaper’s publication day falls on Thanksgiving or a legal holiday, the publication may be made the day before or the day after. A “qualified newspaper” is one meeting § 331A.02, and the terms “legal newspaper,” “official newspaper,” and plain “newspaper” in publication statutes all mean the same thing. Minn. Stat. § 331A.01, subd. 8.
A 2026 change worth knowing — and worth not over-reading. The Legislature enacted a new Minn. Stat. § 484.085 (2026 Minn. Laws ch. 71, § 2), which lets the district court publish a “notice, summons, order, or process in judicial proceedings” on the Minnesota Judicial Branch website when the judicial branch determines there is no qualified local newspaper likely to give notice. But the scope provision is narrow:
This section applies only to notices, summonses, orders, or processes in judicial proceedings that are required by statute, rule, or court order to be published by or through the district court. Nothing in this section authorizes any other person, entity, or political subdivision to post notices, summonses, orders, or processes in judicial proceedings on the website of the Minnesota judicial branch.
Minn. Stat. § 484.085, subd. 4. A Rule 4.04(a) summons is published by the plaintiff, not by or through the district court. Nothing in the new section moves plaintiff-published summonses onto the court’s website, and subdivision 3 confirms the section never requires website posting in the first place. Chapter 71 contains no effective-date clause; under Minn. Stat. § 645.02 the default is August 1 following final enactment (July 1 for an act having appropriation items), and the act was signed May 7, 2026, so it is in force either way.
What happens after service by publication?
Two rules that are routinely confused with each other, and neither one is the proof-of-service rule.
Rule 4.042 is not an affidavit rule — it is a service of the complaint rule. Because a published summons goes out without the complaint (Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.02), the rule sets what happens if the defendant surfaces: if the defendant appears within 14 days after service by publication is complete, the plaintiff must serve the complaint within 7 days of that appearance, and the defendant then has at least 21 days to answer.
Rule 4.043 is the reopening rule, and it is the reason default judgments obtained by publication are fragile. A defendant served by publication who received no actual notification “shall be permitted to defend upon application to the court before judgment and for sufficient cause; and, except in an action for marriage dissolution, the defendant, in like manner, may be permitted to defend at any time within one year after judgment, on such terms as may be just.” If part of the judgment has been enforced by then, “such restitution shall be made as the court may direct.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.043. A publication default is not durable for a year — plan collection accordingly.
How is service proved, and what happens if the proof is wrong?
Proof of service lives in Rule 4.06, captioned “Return.” Service is proved by the certificate of the sheriff or other peace officer, by the affidavit of any other person making it, by the written admission or acknowledgment of the party served, or — for publication — by the affidavit of the printer or the printer’s designee. Except for published notice, the proof “shall state the time, place, and manner of service.”
Then the sentence practitioners forget: “Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of the service.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.06. Service is a historical fact. The affidavit is evidence of it. A defective or missing affidavit is a proof problem, and Rule 4.07 lets the court permit amendment of process or proof of service at any time unless substantial rights would be prejudiced.
Who bears the burden reflects that. “Once the plaintiff submits evidence of service, a defendant who challenges the sufficiency of service of process has the burden of showing that the service was improper.” Shamrock, 754 N.W.2d at 384.
Also note who may serve: “the sheriff or any other person not less than 18 years of age and not a party to the action.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.02. A plaintiff cannot serve his own summons.
The deadline nobody calendars: one year to file, or the case is gone
Because commencement is service, Minnesota cases used to sit unfiled indefinitely. In 2013 the Supreme Court ended that with Rule 5.04(a):
Any action that is not filed with the court within one year of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with prejudice against all parties unless the parties within that year sign a stipulation to extend the filing period.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a). It does not apply to family cases governed by General Rules of Practice 301 to 378.
Read the operative words carefully.
- “Deemed.” No motion is required. In Cole v. Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 2016), the Supreme Court noted that “[a] motion to dismiss is not required under the plain language of Rule 5.04(a).” 884 N.W.2d at 636 n.1. The dismissal happens by operation of the rule.
- “With prejudice.” Not a dismissal without prejudice you can refile — and by the time it bites, the limitations period usually has run anyway.
- “Against all parties.” One unfiled defendant takes the case down.
- “Within that year sign a stipulation.” The escape valve is a stipulation signed inside the year. Not a motion afterward.
Two companion cases decided the same day in 2016 define what is left after the deadline passes.
Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611 (Minn. 2016), held that Rule 60.02 relief is available from a Rule 5.04(a) deemed dismissal, and that such a dismissal does not violate procedural due process. 884 N.W.2d at 617–18, 619. The plaintiff there had commenced in March 2013, litigated actively, reached a tentative $85,000 damages stipulation, and then received a letter from defense counsel announcing the case was over. But the court also held that the district court must consider and expressly find all four Finden requirements — a debatably meritorious claim, a reasonable excuse, due diligence after learning of the error, and no substantial prejudice to the other party — and rejected the Court of Appeals’ contrary view that a movant “need not categorically establish all four.” Id. at 620.
Cole v. Wutzke is the companion on excuse. Counsel there knew about the amendment but misunderstood that it applied to cases pending before its effective date. The district court held that “ignorance of the law” categorically cannot be excusable neglect. The Supreme Court held that applying such a per se rule, without weighing the other factors against the actual circumstances, was an abuse of discretion — and remanded. 884 N.W.2d at 639. The lesson is not that ignorance is excusable. It is that the analysis is discretionary and fact-bound, which means the outcome is genuinely uncertain, which means you do not want to be there.
If you take one operational item from this article: the day you serve, calendar the filing deadline. It runs from service on each defendant, and there is no notice from the court before it hits. See our related discussion of Minnesota deadlines that run from a fact rather than a filing, and, if the deadline has already passed, the four-factor test for vacating under Rule 60.02.
How does a defendant preserve the insufficient-service defense?
Insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process may be raised by pre-answer motion or in the responsive pleading, and “[n]o defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. But the defense is waived if it is omitted from a Rule 12 motion, or if it is neither made by motion nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment permitted as of course under Rule 15.01. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(a).
Beyond the pleadings, waiver turns on conduct. “[S]imple participation in the litigation . . . does not, standing alone, amount to waiver of a jurisdictional defense. Rather, it is the failure to provide the court an opportunity to rule on the defense before affirmatively invoking the court’s jurisdiction on the merits of the claim that is determinative.” Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2000), quoted in Shamrock, 754 N.W.2d at 381. Shamrock found no waiver where the defendant moved to strike the plaintiff’s publication affidavit at the same time he asked the court to rule on the service defense, expressly disclaimed any general appearance, and told the court at argument that “from day one we have always maintained there is no jurisdiction.” 754 N.W.2d at 381–82.
For the separate question of whether a Minnesota court may reach a nonresident at all — a different inquiry from whether the papers were delivered correctly — see Minnesota’s long-arm statute and the five-factor test.
Filing after you serve: the practical layer
Since July 1, 2016, attorneys (“Select Users,” which also includes government agencies and guardians ad litem) must file and serve electronically through the E-Filing System in any case statewide, unless a rule, another rule of court, or a court order says otherwise, with an opt-out available by motion to the chief judge for good cause. Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 14.01(b)(1), (b)(3).
That does not change Rule 4. The original summons and complaint are served under Rule 4 — in person, by sheriff, by waiver, or by publication — and electronic service is for documents after the original complaint. Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.02(b). What e-filing changes is the back end: every document after the complaint must be filed with a certificate of service “specifying the details of how and when service was accomplished and signed under oath or penalty of perjury by the person effecting service,” except that no separate proof of service is required if the document is e-filed and e-served together through the court’s system. Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(b).
A related trap: the court administrator may reject a filing tendered without the required fee or a correct file number, tendered to the wrong court, containing an unauthorized discovery request or response, or containing restricted identifiers filed in violation of General Rules of Practice 11.02, 11.03, or 11.04. Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(c). A rejection is not a filing. If that rejection is what pushed you past the one-year mark, Rule 5.04(d) permits a motion, “in the interests of justice,” to deem the filing effective as of the date it was originally tendered — but only for rejections under (c)(1) (fee/file number) and (c)(4) (restricted identifiers), and relief “is not automatic.”
Madgett Law, LLC
Madgett Law, LLC handles civil litigation in Minnesota state and federal court, including consumer protection, contract and business disputes, and personal injury matters. Getting a case commenced correctly — the right service method for the right defendant, a clean affidavit of service, the publication predicate that will hold up, and the one-year filing deadline on the calendar the day the summons goes out — is unglamorous work that determines whether a claim survives long enough to be decided on its merits. If you have been served, or you are trying to serve someone who does not want to be found, call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.
Related reading: how long you have to sue in Minnesota and Minnesota’s conciliation court, where the service rules are different.
Sources: Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(a)–(c) (three methods of commencement; 60-day condition on sheriff delivery) and advisory comm. cmt. — 2020 amendments (permitted means of delivery to sheriff; fax excluded); Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.02 (complaint served with summons except on publication); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.02 (who may serve — 18 or older, not a party); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) (personal service and “usual place of abode” substituted service), 4.03(b)–(c) (partnerships/associations and corporations; statutory agents); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(a)(1)–(5) (five grounds for publication; affidavit contents; three weeks’ publication; service complete 21 days after first publication); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.041 (property description in publication); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.042 (service of complaint after appearance following publication; 14/7/21 days); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.043 (defense within one year after judgment; restitution); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(a)–(c), (e) (waiver of service; Form 22B; 30/60 days to return; cost-shifting; 60/90 days to answer; jurisdiction and venue not waived) and advisory comm. cmt. — 2018 amendments (“does not authorize service by mere mailing”); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.06 (return; proof does not affect validity of service); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.07 (amendment of process or proof); Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.02(b) (e-service applies to documents after the original complaint); Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a) (one-year filing deadline; deemed dismissal with prejudice; stipulation), 5.04(b) (certificate of service), 5.04(c)–(d) (grounds for rejection; relation back); Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01 (21 days to answer), 12.02 (defenses by motion; no waiver by joinder), 12.08(a) (waiver of service defenses) — all at revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/cp. Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 14.01(b)(1), (b)(3) (mandatory e-filing for Select Users statewide effective July 1, 2016; opt-out for good cause) at revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/gp. Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subds. 1, 3, 5, 6 (service on chapter 322C and other entities; registered agent, then officer/manager/general partner, then Secretary of State; $35 fee; forwarding duty; dissolved entities); Minn. Stat. § 645.11 (meaning of “published notice” for service of a summons or process; qualified newspaper; weekly publication; Thanksgiving/legal-holiday allowance); Minn. Stat. § 331A.01, subd. 8 (definition of “qualified newspaper” and equivalent terms); Minn. Stat. § 484.085, subds. 1, 3, 4 (2026 Minn. Laws ch. 71, § 2) (judicial-branch website publication; optional; scope limited to notices published by or through the district court); Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (default effective dates) — all at revisor.mn.gov. Cases, read in full at the Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law): Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862, 864–65 (Minn. 2016) (certified mail is not personal service; mail carrier lacks intent; return receipt is not an acknowledgment of a summons), quoting Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997); DeCook v. Olmsted Medical Center, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Minn. 2016) (agreement to forego formal service permitted; actual authority required); Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459–60, 119 N.W. 404, 404–05 (1909) (definition of usual place of abode; actual knowledge is not service; married-defendant presumption; jail); Lundgren v. Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 890, 892–93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (estranged spouse’s home not the abode; temporary-absence rule; actual notice insufficient), quoting Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1988); Shamrock Development, Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 381–84 (Minn. 2008) (publication grounds must actually exist; strict compliance; burden on challenger; no waiver of jurisdictional defense), quoting Wiik v. Russell, 173 Minn. 580, 583, 218 N.W. 110, 111 (1928) and Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2000); Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 617–20 (Minn. 2016) (Rule 60.02 applies to a Rule 5.04(a) deemed dismissal; no due process violation; all four Finden factors required); Cole v. Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634, 636 n.1, 639 (Minn. 2016) (no motion required for deemed dismissal; per se “ignorance of the law” rule was an abuse of discretion). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no particular outcome is promised or implied.