Texas Cut a $250,000 Punitive Award to $200,000 by Formula. Minnesota Has No Cap, but You Need a Judge's Permission to Ask.

November 5, 2026 · David J.S. Madgett

A Texas jury found that a homeowner defrauded her contractor. It awarded $56,654.15 in economic damages and $250,000 in exemplary damages, which is what Texas calls punitive damages. Zorrilla v. Aypco Construction II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Tex. 2015). The homeowner never pleaded the statutory cap. She raised it for the first time after the verdict, in her motion for new trial, and the Supreme Court of Texas held that was soon enough, because the cap “applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts.” Id. at 146. The court rendered judgment “capping exemplary damages at $200,000.” Id.

A formula took $50,000 off a jury’s verdict, and the jury was never allowed to hear the formula existed.

In Minnesota there’s no formula. There’s no cap at all in the general punitive-damages statute. What there is instead is a rule that would strike a Texas lawyer as strange: “Upon commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive damages.” Minn. Stat. § 549.191. You have to ask a judge first.

This is a round in my Minnesota-vs-Texas series, which started on the paycheck at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-wage-garnishment-571-922/. The last round, on malpractice caps, is at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-medical-malpractice-damages-cap/. Punitive damages are where the two states’ philosophies split cleanest. Texas trusts arithmetic. Minnesota trusts a judge.

The Texas formula

Here it is:

(b) Exemplary damages awarded against a defendant may not exceed an amount equal to the greater of: (1)(A) two times the amount of economic damages; plus (B) an amount equal to any noneconomic damages found by the jury, not to exceed $750,000; or (2) $200,000.

— Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(b)

Run Zorrilla through it. Two times $56,654.15 is $113,308.30. The award had no noneconomic damages in it, so that branch adds nothing. The greater of $113,308.30 and $200,000 is $200,000. That’s the cap, and it’s why the $250,000 came down. The math is mine; the result is the court’s.

Now a harder case. Say a jury finds $100,000 in economic damages and $1 million in noneconomic damages. Two times the economic damages is $200,000. The noneconomic piece counts only “not to exceed $750,000”. So the most the jury’s punitive award can stand at is $950,000, whatever number the jury actually wrote. The cap is the greater of that or $200,000, and $950,000 wins.

Three more things about how Texas runs it:

The jury is kept in the dark. “The provisions of this section may not be made known to a jury by any means, including voir dire, introduction into evidence, argument, or instruction.” § 41.008(e).

The proof is harder than in an ordinary case, and the vote has to be unanimous. A plaintiff must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that the harm results from “fraud”, “malice”, or “gross negligence.” § 41.003(a). “Malice” means “a specific intent by the defendant to cause substantial injury or harm to the claimant.” § 41.001(7). And “Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the jury was unanimous in regard to finding liability for and the amount of exemplary damages.” § 41.003(d).

The cap has exceptions, seventeen of them, for conduct “described as a felony” in listed sections of the Penal Code, and except for the two intoxication offenses, the conduct has to be committed “knowingly or intentionally”. § 41.008(c). Murder, aggravated assault, sexual assault, forgery, commercial bribery, felony theft, intoxication assault and manslaughter, trafficking, and others. And one carve-out inside a carve-out: injury to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual lifts the cap, “but not if the conduct occurred while providing health care”. § 41.008(c)(7). The nursing home keeps its cap on that one.

Minnesota doesn’t have a number

Minnesota’s standard is one sentence and a definition:

(a) Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.

(b) A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others if the defendant has knowledge of facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to the rights or safety of others and:

(1) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional disregard of the high degree of probability of injury to the rights or safety of others; or

(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high probability of injury to the rights or safety of others.

— Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1

No dollar figure anywhere in the section. It ends by saying the opposite of a cap: “Nothing in this section may be construed to restrict either court’s authority to limit punitive damages.” Id., subd. 5. The limit is a judge, not a number.

Minnesota got here by tightening, not loosening. The Legislature enacted § 549.20 in 1978, and the original standard was “willful indifference.” Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. 2001). “The statute was amended in 1990 to substitute ‘deliberate disregard’ for ‘willful indifference.’ The 1990 amendment further limited punitive damages by defining deliberate disregard.” Id. That 1990 amendment came in the same act, 1990 Minn. Laws ch. 555, that repealed Minnesota’s four-year-old cap on intangible damages, which I covered in the malpractice round. So in one bill, the Legislature took the cap off compensatory damages and put the screws on punitive damages. It chose a standard over a number in both directions.

The standard isn’t limited to people who got hurt. In Jensen, neighbors fighting over a houseboat on the Mississippi stole an electric meter, cut a phone line, spray-painted a garage, and punctured tires on the morning of a wedding. Id. at 248. The only damage was to property, and the lower courts said that meant no punitive damages. The supreme court reversed. It read the statute’s “rights or safety” as two different things, so “rights” reaches more than bodily safety, and it held: “a plaintiff may seek punitive damages in an action for intentional damage to property where the only damage is to property, subject to the limitations of section 549.20.” Id. at 251.

What a Minnesota court weighs instead of a formula is a list in subdivision 3: “the seriousness of hazard to the public”, “the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant,” “the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it,” “the financial condition of the defendant,” and more. Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 3. Texas has a similar list for the jury, including “the net worth of the defendant.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.011(a)(6). The difference is how much room the judges have after the jury uses it. In Minnesota the trial judge “shall specifically review the punitive damages award in light of the factors set forth in subdivision 3 and shall make specific findings with respect to them”, and so does the appellate court. Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 5. Texas reviews too. An appellate court that looks at the amount “shall state, in a written opinion, the court’s reasons for upholding or disturbing the finding or award.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.013(a). But in Texas the formula has set the ceiling before any judge looks.

And the Minnesota jury doesn’t have to be unanimous. In any civil action, after six hours of deliberation, a verdict may be returned “upon an agreement by five-sixths of its number.” Minn. Stat. § 546.17. I found nothing in § 549.20 that changes that for punitive damages. In Texas, one holdout juror ends the punitive claim.

The gate

Minnesota’s real control is the front door. The complaint can’t ask for punitive damages. A party has to move to amend, with “one or more affidavits showing the factual basis for the claim”, and “if the court finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion, the court shall grant the moving party permission to amend the pleadings to claim punitive damages.” Minn. Stat. § 549.191. I walked through how that motion works, and when to bring it, at /news/minnesota-punitive-damages-permission-549191/. Minnesota liked the idea enough to use it again for insurance bad-faith claims, which I covered at /news/minnesota-insurance-bad-faith-604-18/.

So a Minnesota plaintiff clears a gate after filing, then clear and convincing evidence at trial, then a judge’s written findings. A Texas plaintiff clears clear and convincing evidence and a unanimous jury, and then runs into arithmetic. I read all of Texas’s chapter 41, §§ 41.001 through 41.014, and it has no permission-to-plead step like Minnesota’s.

Minnesota has one number of its own

Here’s the twist I didn’t expect. Texas takes the lid off its cap for felony theft. Minnesota’s civil-theft statute puts a lid on. A person who steals personal property “is civilly liable to the owner of the property for its value when stolen plus punitive damages of either $50 or up to 100 percent of its value when stolen, whichever is greater.” Minn. Stat. § 604.14, subd. 1. That’s a claim-specific statute, not § 549.20, and how it fits with an ordinary conversion claim is a question I took up at /news/minnesota-conversion-civil-theft-604-14/. And a “municipality” sued on a tort claim under chapter 466 can’t be hit with punitive damages at all: “No award for damages on any such claim shall include punitive damages.” Minn. Stat. § 466.04, subd. 1(b).

Washington caps both states anyway

Neither state gets the last word. The Due Process Clause does.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), a Utah jury awarded $145 million in punitive damages; the trial court cut compensatory damages to $1 million and punitive to $25 million, and the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million. Id. at 412, 415. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 429. It wouldn’t draw a bright line, but it came close: “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” Id. at 425.

Texas shows you how that plays with a state cap. In Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010), feuding San Saba County ranchers fought over thirteen head of cattle that had wandered down a dry riverbed. Id. at 868–69. The neighbor was acquitted of felony theft, but a civil jury found conversion, awarded $5,327.11 in actual damages, and added $1.25 million in exemplary damages, ratios the court put at 47:1 and 188:1. Id. at 869. Because the conduct was felony theft, the Texas cap didn’t apply: “the Legislature makes this statutory ceiling inapplicable to conduct constituting third-degree (and higher) felony theft, like stealing cattle.” Id. at 882. The court sent the award back for remittitur anyway. “Lifting the $200,000 cap in some cases does not demonstrate constitutional propriety in this case. Indeed, even an award well below the statutory ceiling can offend due process.” Id. And on that record, “even 4:1 seems a stretch”. Id. at 883.

I want to emphasize what that means for a Minnesota case. No Minnesota statute caps a § 549.20 award, but Campbell applies here exactly as it applies in Texas. A Minnesota judge reviewing an award under subdivision 5 is reviewing it with a single-digit ratio in the background. “No cap” in Minnesota means no statutory cap. It doesn’t mean no ceiling.

Which state is better for the person who was wronged?

It depends on which person.

If you’re the plaintiff with a strong case and modest economic losses, Minnesota, and by a lot. A fraud victim with $50,000 in losses in Texas starts with a ceiling of $200,000 no matter what the defendant did. In Minnesota the ceiling is whatever a judge, applying the subdivision 3 factors and due process, will sustain. And you don’t need a unanimous jury.

If you’re the plaintiff with a thin case, Minnesota is harder at the start. You can’t plead punitive damages at all until a judge finds prima facie evidence. Texas’s chapter 41 has no such step.

If you’re the defendant, or the defendant’s insurer, Texas, and that’s the point of the Texas statute. The ceiling is arithmetic on the jury’s own compensatory findings, with a $200,000 floor you can see before trial starts. In Minnesota there’s no ceiling to compute, and the trial-court findings and the post-trial motions do the work the formula does in Texas; the motions that preserve those fights are at /news/minnesota-post-trial-motions-rule-50-59/.

Texas decided in advance what bad conduct is worth. Minnesota makes a judge look at it first.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC handles civil litigation in Minnesota, from the pleadings through trial and appeal, including the motion to amend that a punitive-damages claim has to win before it exists. More is on our general litigation page. If you think what was done to you was deliberate, the affidavit record for that motion starts with what you can document now, so send us a message.

Sources: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.001(7) (malice defined); § 41.003(a), (d) (clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or gross negligence; unanimity); § 41.008(b), (c), (e) (limitation on exemplary damages; felony exceptions, including (c)(7) health-care carve-out; jury not informed); § 41.011(a) (evidence relating to amount); § 41.013(a) (written appellate review of exemplary awards); ch. 41, §§ 41.001–41.014, read in full (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council). Zorrilla v. Aypco Construction II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 146, 150 (Tex. 2015) (cap applies automatically when invoked; $56,654.15 economic and $250,000 exemplary; judgment rendered at $200,000); Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 868–69, 882–83 (Tex. 2010) (felony-theft exception; due-process remittitur). State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412, 415, 425, 429 (2003). Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subds. 1, 3, 5 (standard; factors; judicial review; history 1978 c 738 s 4; 1990 c 555 s 15–18); § 549.191 (claim for punitive damages); § 546.17 (five-sixths verdict); § 604.14, subd. 1 (civil liability for theft); § 466.04, subd. 1(b) (no punitive damages against municipalities) (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2026 Minnesota Statutes); 1990 Minn. Laws ch. 555. Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 248, 250–51 (Minn. 2001) (1978 “willful indifference” standard; 1990 “deliberate disregard” amendment; punitive damages available for intentional damage to property). This article is general information about Minnesota law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied.

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